COUNTER-
POINT

Policing the Remnants of War*

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Certain standard, indeed classic, varieties of war have become so rare and unlikely that they could well be considered to be obsolescent, if not obsolete. Moreover, much, but not all, of what remains of war is substantially opportunistic predation waged by packs of criminals, bandits, and thugs who engage in warfare in much the same way as they often did in medieval and early modern Europe: as mercenaries recruited or dragooned by weak (or even desperate) state governments or as warlord gangs developed within failed or weak states. Much of this warfare could be reduced or substantially eliminated by disciplined police and military forces and, in their new era of essential consensus in the wake of the Cold War, the developed countries could create mechanisms for policing civil warfare. However, they are likely to do so with any sort of reliability only where their interests seem importantly engaged or where they manage to become self-entrapped. Rather, the key lies in the establishment of competent domestic military and policing forces, tracing a process Europe went through in the middle of the last millennium. Indeed, much of the civil warfare that persists in the world today is a function of the extent to which inadequate governments exist. Of late, there seems to have been an increase in the number of countries led by effective people who, instead of looting and dissipating their country's resources, appear to be dedicated to adopting policies that will further its orderly development. Thus, while far from certain, a further (or continuing) decline in a most common remaining kind of war does seem to be an entirely reasonable prospect.

Introduction

In some very important respects, the institution of war is clearly in decline. Certain standard, indeed classic, varieties of war – particularly major war or wars among developed countries – have become so rare and unlikely that they could well be considered to be obsolescent, if not obsolete. Also in notable decline, it appears, are conventional war more generally, conventional civil war, colonial war, and ideological civil war.[1]

Moreover, much, but not all, of what

remains of war, sometimes labeled 'new war', 'ethnic conflict', or, most grandly, 'clashes of civilizations', is more nearly opportunistic predation waged by packs – often remarkably small ones – of criminals, bandits, and thugs. To a substantial and perhaps increasing degree, then, warfare has been reduced to its remnants – or dregs – and thugs are the residual combatants. And history and recent experience suggest that much of this could be, and perhaps is being, reduced or substantially eliminated by disciplined police and military forces. The key to dealing with these wars lies more with the development of competent domestic governments than with the application of international policing. This article explores these themes.

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[1] For an assessment of this process, see Mueller (1989, 1995: chs. 8–9). See also Mueller (forthcoming).

The Remnants of War

Most contemporary war is civil war and almost all of it occurs in poor countries.[2] A survey of the three dozen or so wars that have been waged since the end of the Cold War suggests that many, often most, of the combatants in these wars are criminals and thugs who engage in warfare in much the same way as they often did in medieval and early modern Europe: as mercenaries recruited or dragooned by weak (or even desperate) state governments or as warlord gangs developed within failed or weak states. A few contemporary civil wars, however, do variously betray elements of disciplined, if mainly unconventional, conflict, as does much terrorism.[3]

Criminal Warfare: The Mercenary Approach

The wars in former Yugoslavia illustrate the mercenary process best (Mueller, 2000a,b). It is important to note that the Serbian (or Yugoslav) army rather substantially disintegrated early in the hostilities and this, as Burg & Shoup (1999: 137) observe, 'led all sides to rely on irregulars and special units'.[4] Specifically, like many of the lords and kings of medieval Europe, the politicians recruited criminals and hooligans to get into the action. As part of this process, it appears that

thousands of prison inmates, promised shortened sentences and enticed by the prospect that they could 'take whatever booty you can', were released in Serbia for the war effort (Borger, 1997; Cohen, 1998: 192, 410–411). Similarly, the initial fighting forces of Bosnia and of Croatia were also substantially made up of small bands of criminals and violent opportunists recruited or self-recruited from street gangs.

Thus, the key dynamic of the conflicts was not in the risings of neighbor against neighbor, still less in the clashings of civilizations. Rather, it was in the focused predations of comparatively small groups of violent, and very often drunken, thugs and criminals recruited and semi-coordinated by politicians. Identity, ethnicity, nationalism, civilization, culture, and religion proved to be more nearly an excuse, pretext, or general organizing principle for their predations rather than an independent cause of them.

Other instances in which governments and armies have recruited criminals and thugs essentially as mercenary forces include some of the 'death squads' in Latin America and elsewhere (Campbell & Brenner, 2000). Particularly in the last years of its occupation of East Timor, the Indonesian army found it useful to band together and coordinate the activities of East Timorese 'toughs' and 'musclemen', as Moore (2001) calls them, into paramilitary units. In Somalia, warlord Mohammed Aidid ran his fiefdom with a few dozen hired guns paid in part with drugs (Bowden, 1999: 109, 368), and a large number of criminals were recruited into the national guard of Chechnya (Lieven, 1998: 61–62, 75, 81).

Criminal Warfare: The Brigand Approach

When governments become weak, it is likely (almost by definition) that criminal activity will increase, and sometimes the resulting criminality will be organized enough to look like war. Often the government itself – or even one from a neighboring country – can

[2] For recent tabulations of the relative frequency of armed conflicts, see Gleditsch et al. (2002), Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg (2003), and Marshall & Gurr (2003). By one calculation, a poor country is 85 times more likely to experience violent conflict than a rich one (Ellingsen, 2000: 243). See also Collier (2000: 97, 109–110), Hegre et al. (2001: 37, 40), Mack (2002: 521), Fearon & Laitin (2003: 83).
[3] For the argument that these remaining wars are anything but 'new' in form or substance, see Kalyvas (2001).
[4] This process is almost too vividly illustrated by the experience of General Slavko Lisica, who tried to shame Serb conscripts in Croatia into fighting by declaring that all those who were not prepared to 'defend the glory of the Serbian nation' should lay down their arms and take off their uniforms. To his astonishment, 'they all did, including their commanding officer'. Furious, he shouted at them 'to remove everything including their underpants, and with the exception of one man they all removed their military issue underpants and marched off completely naked'. Later, he says, the recruits managed to commandeer a cannon and used it to shell his headquarters (Doder & Branson, 1999: 97–98).

essentially become one of the criminal or warlord bands (Keen, 1998: ch. 2; Reno, 1998; Gamba & Cornwell, 2000; Berkeley, 2001). Several wars in Africa illustrate the brigand process best. As Berkeley (2001: 15) puts it, 'Ethnic conflict in Africa is a form of organized crime', and the 'warring factions are best understood not as "tribes" but as racketeering enterprises'.

A weakened regime in Liberia was toppled by an armed group initially of 100 or so led by an accused embezzler ($922,382) and jail-break artist, Charles Taylor, and by a somewhat larger group that had spun off from Taylor's forces, led by a psychopathic, hymn-singing drunk named Prince Yormi Johnson (Ellis, 1999: 2–4, 10, 15, 67–68, 74–75, 319; Reno, 1998: 92). Life as a combatant was routinely facilitated by alcohol and drugs, and it is estimated that 25–30% emerged from the war with a serious drug problem (Ellis, 1999: 134).

To put down a rebellion in neighboring Sierra Leone, the government rapidly expanded its not-very-good army of 3,000 to a really terrible one of 14,000. This rag-tag force, consisting mostly of 'drop-outs and robbers' according to a prominent Sierra Leonean human-rights campaigner, was sent, under-paid, undertrained, and underfed, into combat under commanders who had a distinct preference for leading from the rear (Keen, 1998: 26–28; Reno, 1998: 125). Rather than taking the rebels on, the troops quickly fragmented into bandit gangs and sought to profit from the chaos. Similar patterns of conflict and mayhem have taken place in Nigeria (Reno, 1998), Sudan (Berkeley, 2001), Angola (Gamba & Cornwell, 2000), and Congo (Reno, 1998; Berkeley, 2001), and various countries in the Caucasus and central Asia (Lieven, 1998: ch. 1).[5]

In some respects, the long war in Colombia also fits this pattern. The FARC guerrillas act much like a brigand force (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001: 47–51; Keen, 1998: 35). In opposition are paramilitaries, some of whom work as mercenaries for landowners or business people, while others go off on their own, applying guerrilla tactics against the guerrillas, claiming turf and setting up private fiefdoms. Many of these forces, like the guerrillas, engage in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, or setting up protection rackets (Sánchez, 2001: 20–25; Rabasa & Chalk, 2001: xvi, 53–55, 58–59).

Disciplined Warfare

Although few, if any, of the armed civil conflicts in the post-Cold War era seem clearly and unambiguously to be disciplined wars, differentiating criminal from disciplined warfare is not always easy. Almost all wars – particularly civil wars – contain elements of both. Moreover, at various times disciplined combatants can degenerate into opportunistic criminal predators, while criminal armies can sometimes get their act together and perform like disciplined ones – standing, fighting, and risking their lives for a cause or agenda.

A good case in point is Afghanistan. Reacting to the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghan warriors fought a guerrilla war with tenacity and discipline against the well-armed but often ill-led and incompetent invaders, causing them to withdraw in 1989. In the aftermath of that victory, however, the former disciplined combatants disintegrated into dozens of squabbling and corrupt warlord and bandit gangs, plundering the population they had once defended (Rashid, 2000: chs. 1–2). A similar pattern seems to have held in the 1994–96 war in Chechnya.

Today, substantial elements of disciplined

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[5] Assessing the warlord predation that is taking place in several countries in Africa, Keen (2000: 26) describes a process in which 'one avoids battles, picks on unarmed civilians, and makes money'. He calls this 'war', but his characterization seems much more nearly to be a description of crime. In fact, many of these 'low-intensity wars' seem more nearly to be high-intensity crime.

warfare can be seen in the lengthy, persistent conflict in Sri Lanka in which a tenacious guerrilla group, the Tamil Tigers, is battling for secession. Some Kurdish rebels in Turkey may fit the same pattern. In the second war in Chechnya, begun in 1999, many of the defending combatants seem once again to have reverted from banditry to disciplined, dedicated warfare against the massively destructive Russian army. Moreover, the attacks against Israel by various Arab groups may now have become so continuous and organized that what is going on there can be called disciplined warfare rather than terrorism.

Policing the Remnants of War

'The Clausewitzian analysis is breaking down', writes Keegan (2001: 39). 'War is escaping from state control, into the hands of bandits and anarchists'. Therefore, 'the great work of disarming tribes, sects, warlords and criminals – a principal achievement of monarchs in the 17th century and empires in the 19th – threatens to need doing all over again'. War, of course, is not escaping anyone's control in the once war-prone developed world – quite the reverse. But there are substantial areas in the developing world where it clearly has.

The intimidating, opportunistic, and very often drugged or drunken thugs have been successful mainly because they are the biggest bullies on the block. However, like most bullies (and sadists and torturers), they tend not to be particularly interested in engaging a formidable opponent. Moreover, they substantially lack organization, discipline, coherent tactics or strategy, deep motivation, broad popular support, or ideological commitment.

Therefore, a sufficiently large, impressively armed, and well-disciplined policing force can be effective in pacifying those conflicts which are thug-dominated. The thugs would still

exist of course, but insofar as they remained unpacified, they would be reduced to sporadic and improvised crime and violence, not town mastery. For example, during the post-Cold War period, disciplined forces were up against criminal ones in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Bosnia.[6] In all cases, the disciplined forces triumphed easily and at remarkably low cost in casualties – though in Somalia the peace-keepers found that cost to be insufficiently low given the value of the stakes.

Policing by Developed Countries

In their new era of essential consensus in the wake of the Cold War, the developed countries have been free to explore various devices for managing the world. Some of these devices are diplomatic, social, or economic, but the judicious application of military force is also potentially available. Freed of disagreements among themselves – at least of disagreements that could lead to violent conflict between them – they are free to carry out the 'great work' that Keegan calls for, in a series of what might be called 'policing wars'.

It seems unlikely, however, that the developed states will be able to respond to this opportunity by creating mechanisms for systematically dealing with civil warfare. They are likely to intervene with any sort of reliability either by themselves or through international bodies only where their interests are or seem to be importantly engaged or where they manage to become self-entrapped. And even then, they are likely to intervene with enormous concern about suffering too many casualties of their own.

From time to time, their attention may be arrested by concerns about international terrorism, about the dispersion of 'weapons

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[6] While Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia remained criminal-dominated, their enemies developed disciplined, non-criminal forces (Mueller, 2000a: 64–65).

of mass destruction' to what are sometimes called 'rogue states', about the flow of illegal drugs to their own populations, and about refugee flows that cause them trouble and cost them money. Thus, armed ventures may be launched to push back international aggression, as in the Persian Gulf in 1991, or to relieve the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq of vicious and unpopular regimes a decade later. But these ventures are primarily impelled and justified by fears about terrorist or international threats that seem to emanate from those countries, not by humanitarian concerns about the conditions of their peoples. For the most part, then, developed countries are likely to see most civil conflicts as essentially irrelevant to their interests and thus to remain aloof.[7]

International bodies and consortiums of developed countries can often be useful to broker ceasefires and peace settlements, and they can sometimes assist with humanitarian aid and economic and political development once peace has been achieved. However, a truly effective solution to the problem of residual warfare lies elsewhere. And there may be one.

Policing by Effective Governments

It seems likely that the key to controlling the remnants of war is the establishment of competent domestic military and policing forces, tracing a process Europe went through in the middle of the last millennium. After all, it was not efforts by the international community that brought warfare, particularly civil warfare, under control in Europe, but rather the develop-

ment of capable governments.[8] And, to a very substantial degree, much of the civil warfare that persists in the world today is a function of the extent to which inadequate governments exist.

As one study finds (Hegre et al., 2001), civil wars are least likely to occur in stable democracies and in stable autocracies – that is, in countries with effective governments and policing forces (see also Oberschall, 2001: 135–136; Russett & Oneal, 2001: 70; Marshall & Gurr, 2003: 19–20, 25; Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 85, 88; Tilly, 2003: ch. 2). Stable democracies, almost by definition, have effective policing forces, and they deal with grievance by bringing the aggrieved into the process (as long as it is expressed peacefully) and listening to the grievance. Stable autocracies also have capable policing forces – in fact, they are often called 'police states'. They rule through the selective, but persistent, application of terror – through vigilant domestic spying and through effective, if often brutal, suppression. North Korea and Cuba provide contemporary examples.

In fact, in an important sense, many civil wars have effectively been *caused* by inept governments. Because of closed political systems and policing methods in which excessive and indiscriminate force is employed to try to deal with relatively small bands of troublemakers, inept governments can turn friendly or indifferent people into hostile ones and vastly increase the size of the problems they are trying to deal with. As Keen (1998: 21) has observed, 'the aggression of counter-insurgency forces has repeatedly alienated their potential civilian supporters, and this has often continued even when evidently counter-productive from a military point of view'.

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[7] Under the administration of George W. Bush, the United States, unchallenged militarily in the world after the Cold War, explored the possibility of taking out perceived threats to itself by unilateral or near-unilateral military measures in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. Whether this constitutes a new application of war for what the United States, at least, would take to be policing purposes remains to be seen. The messy aftermaths of these two wars suggest its appeals are likely to be limited.

[8] Of course, the attainment of civil order did not keep European governments from engaging in international wars. However, the present aversion to international war should continue to limit such wars even in a world filled with competent states – as it has in once-warlike Europe.

The spectacularly counterproductive effort of the Serbs to police small bands of Albanian terrorists in their Kosovo province supplies a pertinent case in point. Although the terrorists of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) did not enjoy great support among the Albanians, particularly in the cities, the Serb depredations, carried out mainly by special paramilitary units under the direction of the ministry of the interior in Belgrade, greatly increased the support for the terrorists by essentially forcing Albanians to choose between rule by brutish racist thugs from their own ethnic group or rule by brutish racist thugs from the other ethnic group (Hedges, 1998; O'Connor, 1998; Judah, 1999). The KLA, which numbered no more than 150 before the massacres, quickly increased to an estimated 12,000 (Steele, 1998; Hedges, 1999: 34–36).

Similarly counterproductive was the Indonesian military invasion and occupation of East Timor in 1975. Coming on the heels of a brief civil conflict, the Indonesians could probably have obtained a degree of support from one side as well as acquiescence from the majority of the population. But the invaders instead engaged in an orgy of indiscriminate brutality, torture, murder, rape, massacre, looting, and pillage. This forced much of the population into rebel territory, hardened resistance, and led to an on-and-off guerrilla conflict that lasted 24 years and ended in an internationally supervised loss of the conquest. It is notable that when the Portuguese controlled East Timor, they did so with a military force of no more than 1,500, while the Indonesians needed forces in the tens of thousands (Dunn, 1995: 65–72).

Similar processes have taken place in Algeria (Kalyvas, 1999: 261), Sierra Leone (Keen, 1998: 26–28), Liberia (Ellis, 1999: 76–79, 11 3; Howe, 1996/97: 149), Chechnya (Lieven, 1998: 126–134), Lebanon (Mackey, 1989: 175, 204), Guatemala (Stoll, 1993; Valentino, 2003), and elsewhere.

Something comparable can happen when the police and government, either through incompetence or lack of will, are unable to protect minorities from rioters who purport to represent the majority. In Sri Lanka, for example, Tamils variously have identified themselves by their origin of emigration or by the region of the country in which they lived. But gangs of Sinhalese, reacting to incidents of Tamil terrorism, rioted against Tamils in Colombo and elsewhere in 1983, looting, killing, and setting fires while the police mainly stood by in effective, and sometimes actual, complicity. Tamils of all varieties then fled to safety in one potentially secessionist corner of the country, one that came to be controlled by Tamil terrorists acting as warlords (Tambiah, 1986: 21; Kloos, 2001). Something similar happened in Azerbaijan in 1988 (Kaufman, 2001: 64).

Prosperity may be beneficial if it helps to develop, or comes associated with, competent governments and police forces, but wealth itself is not the key operative factor. Thus, it is entirely possible to imagine Bosnian-like chaos in prosperous Quebec or Northern Ireland if the Canadian or British authorities had attempted to deal with conflicts there through murderous rampage rather than through patient policing and political accommodation.

Indeed, when poor countries adopt sound and accommodating political policies, they often do quite well. Thus, ethnic violence has been avoided in Bulgaria and Romania even though those countries are hardly more developed than Serbia or Bosnia and even though they have experienced considerably greater ethnic tension.[9] And the most impressive case is Macedonia, former Yugoslavia's poorest province. In 1991, Kaplan (1991: 104) ominously declared that

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[9] On Bulgaria, see Ganev (1997) and Barany (2002). On Romania and Slovakia, see Linden (2000). On Kazakhstan, see Kaufman (2001: 78–80).

'Macedonia is once again poised to erupt. . . . Rarely has the very process of history been so transparent and cyclical.' Over the course of a tense decade, despite those 'transparent and cyclical' threats, Macedonian political leaders deftly and successfully sought calm accommodation and substantially achieved it (Lund, 2000; Ackermann, 2000). Things became more difficult later with the rise of an armed insurgency based outside the country – in Kosovo – after the war there of 1999. There were some very rough moments, particularly when the government seemed on the verge of sending Slav gangs into the action (Wood, 2001). However, in part because of active work by the European Community, the Macedonian leadership again was able to keep things under control (Pearson, 2002). Its experience strongly suggests that the disasters in the more prosperous areas of former Yugoslavia, far from being inevitable, could very likely have been avoided if politicians and police had behaved more sensibly.

Thus, the establishment of effective government or, more specifically, of coherent and responsive political systems and disciplined military and policing forces, is the key to engendering and maintaining civil peace – to policing the thugs, brigands, bandits, highwaymen, goons, bullies, criminals, pirates, mercenaries, robbers, adventurers, hooligans, and children who seem to be the chief remaining perpetrators of a type of violence that can be said to resemble war.

Effective Government and Trends in Residual Warfare

People who carefully track the incidence of various forms of violent conflict generally agree on the overall pattern of warfare and armed conflict since World War II. There was something of a tapering-off after that conflict, a rise (mainly in civil warfare)

beginning in the 1960s or so that peaked in the early 1990s, and a decline since then (see Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2003; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Marshall & Gurr, 2003: 12–14; Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 77–78; Tilly, 2003: ch. 3).

Obviously, these broad patterns mask all kinds of subtlety and variety, but their overall shape does conform fairly well to the discussion above. The key to the amount of residual (mainly criminal) warfare in the world, it has been argued, is not the degree to which there is hatred, grievance, or ethnic or civilizational cleavage, but rather the degree to which governments function adequately.

And it appears that the trends in warfare track rather well the existence of weak governments. With the decolonization of the late 1950s and 1960s, a group of poorly governed societies came into being, and, in part because of the processes outlined above, many found themselves having to deal with civil warfare. Moreover, as civil wars became criminal enterprises, they tended to become longer and to accumulate in number (Keen, 1998: ch. 2; Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 77–78). This pattern may have been embellished by another phenomenon: democratization, which is often accompanied by a period in which governments become weak (see also Collier, 2000: 98, 108; Hegre et al., 2001; Snyder, 2000). Most of the datasets document a notable rise – or acceleration in the upward trend – in civil war after 1975, a pattern that coincides rather closely with the rise in democracy that began at that time.

Then, in the aftermath of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there was a further increase in the number of incompetent governments as weak, confused, ill-directed, and sometimes criminal governments emerged in many of the post-Communist countries, replacing comparatively competent police states. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the developed countries no longer had nearly as much interest in

financially propping up some Third World governments and helping them police themselves – an effect particularly noticeable in Africa (Reno, 1998: ch. 2; Keen, 1998: 23; Bates, 2001: ch. 5).

By the mid-1990s, however, a large number of countries had managed to get through the rough period and had achieved a considerable degree of democratic stability – especially in Latin America, post-communist Europe, and East and Southeast Asia – and relatively effective governments had emerged in most of them. Moreover, lingering ideological civil wars inspired or exacerbated by the Cold War contest died out (or became transmogrified into criminal ones) with its demise.

POGG

Experience suggests, then, that the essential, and long-term, solution to the problems of civil warfare lies not in ministrations by the international community – so often half-hearted, half-vast, and half-coherent – but rather in the establishment of competent domestic governments in the many places that do not now have them.

The Canadians, as it happens, have the appropriate slogan. Many countries and institutions have mottos designed to get the blood flowing, ones that cry for, and are often delivered through, a thicket of exclamation points. There is, for example, 'Liberty! Equality! Fraternity!', or 'Duty! Honor! Country!', or 'One Reich! One People! One Führer!'. Canada's national slogan, by contrast, is one of studied modesty: 'Peace, Order and Good Government'.

But whatever the slogan's failings, POGG, as embarrassed Canadians sometimes flippantly put it, is what people throughout the world seem to need and to be yearning for. There is plenty of 'ethnic conflict' in Canada – between Francophones and Anglophones –

but that conflict over the course of a third of a century resulted in exactly one death (Horowitz, 2001: 561). And there is a reason for that: Good Government.

As it happens, the world is not a teeming mass of frustrated, angry, hate-filled fanatics seeking to express their ethnic, religious, cultural, or civilizational angst in cataclysmic violence against each other in a Hobbesian state of nature. There are small numbers of people, it is true, who are drawn to violence and yearn to experience its exhilarations and its potential profits. Some of these are, indeed, fanatics and true believers, but most are criminals and thugs, and small, un-policed, or badly policed bands of these people can cause vastly more devastation than their numbers would seem to imply.[10] What is needed to keep them in check – to establish peace and order – is good government, following the path the developed world fell upon in the middle of the last millennium.

But for the most part, the establishment of peace and order through good government – which is perhaps the way the Canadian motto should be read – needs to be accomplished by people within the countries themselves. Sometimes, international authorities, working out of or under the direction of the developed countries, have been able to aid or speed the process. And they can certainly be of assistance when a country sincerely desires to develop the kind of competent military and police forces that have helped bring peace and prosperity to

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[10] In a review of several studies of 'ethnic' war, Fearon & Laitin (2000: 869) observe that 'what is described as ethnic violence looks very much like gang violence with no necessary ethnic dimension' in which what is required is simply the 'availability of mobilizable thugs'. They then muse: 'One might ask if there has been a great upsurge in ethnic war since the end of the Cold War, or whether more insurgencies are not labeled "ethnic" due to opportunistic redescriptions and salesmanship by rebel leaders seeking support from great power patrons newly disposed to see ethnic rather than Left-Right conflict'. Indeed, one might very well ask that.

the developed world. Moreover, the example of the developed societies – civil, prosperous, flexible, productive, and free from organized violent conflict – can be most attractive, as indicated by the masses of people from the developing world who are trying to immigrate there, abandoning in fear and disgust the turmoil and violence of their home countries. However, unless the developed world wants once again to engage in a form of colonialism, it is likely that exercises in nation-building that are productive of peace and order will have to be accomplished – and, ultimately, with results that are most likely to be lasting – by forces that are domestic.

Over the course of the last few decades, there seems to have been an increase in the developing world in the number of countries that are led by effective people who, instead of looting and dissipating their country's resources like Zaire's Mobutu, seem to be dedicated to adopting policies that will further its orderly development – something Rotberg (2002) labels 'positive leadership'. This has happened in almost all of Latin America as well as in many places in Asia – areas that, not coincidentally, have also experienced a considerable decline in warfare.

Whether Africa – the area that continues to be most plagued by civil warfare – will follow that pattern is yet to be determined, but there are at least some hopeful signs. Quite remarkable changes have taken place in South Africa, which managed to move to coherent, responsive democracy from a condition that was part democracy and part police state – although huge problems remain. Central to that remarkable accomplishment was the judicious leadership of the country's first elected post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela.

The Mandela approach may be gradually replacing the Mobutu one in Africa and elsewhere (Reno, 2000: 59; Berkeley, 2001: 226–242; Rotberg, 2002). Among the potential candidates variously suggested as 'new leaders' are Musaveni in Uganda, the younger Kabila in Congo, Kagame in Rwanda, Obasanjo in Nigeria, Deby in Chad, Konare and perhaps Touré in Mali, Wade in Senegal, and Karzai in Afghanistan. Whether such people will proliferate in other countries, whether these people will truly follow the Mandela route rather than the Mobutu one, and whether they will really be able to improve the situation in their countries remains to be seen, of course. But since competent government seems to be vital to controlling civil warfare, this development could be of profound importance.[11]

There are signs, then, that in an increasing number of places fanatics, criminals, and thugs, the chief authors and organizers of what remains of war in the world, are being brought under control or sometimes aptly coopted by effective governments. Criminality and criminal predation will still exist (there is some of that even in Canada) and so will terrorism which, like crime, can be carried out by individuals or very small groups. And there will certainly be plenty of other problems to worry about – famine, disease, malnutrition, pollution, corruption, poverty, politics, and economic travail.

However, while far from certain, a further (or continuing) decline in a most common remaining kind of war does seem to be an entirely reasonable prospect.

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[11] That such a change is possible and can happen quite quickly is suggested by the experience in Latin America, where military leaders became increasingly convinced that military dictatorship was a thing of the past, and country after country became democratic.

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