Book

Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq (Cornell University Press, 2009).

Articles and Chapters

Forthcoming. “Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” International Organization. (with Yoram Haftel)

Forthcoming. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design." International Studies Quarterly (with Daniel Verdier)

Forthcoming. "Coercive Enforcement of International Law." In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations, edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack. New York. Cambridge University Press.

Forthcoming. “Why Did Bush Bypass the UN in 2003? Unilateralism, Multilateralism and Presidential Leadership.” White House Studies.

2011. “International Organization: Institutions and Order in World Politics.” In Production of Legal Rules, edited by Francesco Parisi (Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd Ed.), pp. 309-36. Edward Elger Press. (with Duncan Snidal)

2010. “Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime.” European Journal of International Relations 16(2): 169-96.

2010. “The Politics of IO Performance: A Framework.” Review of International Organizations 5(3): 227-48. (with Tamar Gutner)
This is part of a special issue on The Politics of IO Performance, co-edited by Gutner and Thompson. Click here to see the entire volume.

2009. “The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma.” International Theory 1(2): 307-21.

2009. “Mitigation through Resource Transfers to Developing Countries: Expanding Greenhouse Gas Offsets.” In Climate Change Policy Beyond Kyoto, edited by Robert N. Stavins and Joseph E. Aldy. Cambridge University Press. (with Andrew Keeler).
An earlier version appeared as a Discussion Paper for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. You may view it here.

2006. “The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(2): 253-75. (with Yoram Haftel)

2006. “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission.” International Organization 61(1): 1-34.

2006. “Screening Power: International Organizations as Informative Agents.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson & Michael Tierney. Cambridge University Press.

2006. “Management under Anarchy: The International Politics of Climate Change.” Climatic Change 78(1): 7-29.

2003. “International Commitments and Domestic Politics: Institutions and Actors at Two Levels.” In Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions, edited by Daniel Drezner. University of Michigan Press. (with Duncan Snidal)

2002. “Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls.” Journal of Legal Studies 31(1, Pt. 2): 285-306.

2000. “Canadian Foreign Policy and Straddling Stocks: Sustainability in an Interdependent World.” Policy Studies Journal 28(1): 219-35.

2000. “International Organization.” In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. 5: 692-722. Edward Elgar Press. (with Duncan Snidal).

Selected Working Papers

“Coercive Enforcement of International Law.”

In International Law and International Relations: Insights from Interdisciplinary Scholarship, edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack. Cambridge University Press, under contract.

“Principal Problems: UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq and Beyond”

With heightened concern over the proliferation of WMD, multilateral weapons inspections under the auspices of the UN provide an increasingly important alternative to war. Borrowing insights from principal-agent theory, I analyze the Iraq inspections case of the 1990s to derive lessons for both theory and policy. I show that the Security Council (the principal) undermined UNSCOM (its agent) by providing insufficient resources, by displaying inadequate unity and resolve, and by directly subverting the inspections process. This suggests that those interested in applying theories of delegation to international security institutions should focus as much on “principal problems” as on traditional agency problems, and more generally that our tendency to blame IO agents for poor outcomes may be misplaced.For multilateral inspections to succeed, I recommend that concerned states plan for shorter interventions and endow inspectors with sufficient resources from the start, before political momentum is lost. I also suggest that more independent IOs are most likely to be successful at conducting intrusive inspections.

“The Two-Level Politics of International Delegation: The United States and WTO Dispute Settlement”

The existing literature on delegation to international organizations (IOs) does not sufficiently explore the domestic political reasons for why governments have incentives to transfer authority to the international level.  In comparison to other domestic actors, Executives benefit disproportionately when issues are managed through IOs since they act as the state’s representative at the international level.  In various ways delegation strengthens the hand of the Executive relative to legislatures and special interests.  This helps explain why even powerful states delegate to constraining IOs: for Executives, a loss of relative influence and bargaining power at the international level might be offset by increased leverage at the domestic level.  This paper illustrates these points by showing how domestic political conflict between the U.S. President and Congress helps explain the nature and timing of WTO legalization.

“Multi-Lateralisms: Explaining Variation in Regime Instruments” (with Daniel Verdier)

Different international regimes are built from legal instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral or a combination thereof. We investigate the reasons for such variation. The choice between multilateralism and bilateralism is a function of the trade-off between each instrument’s relative flaw. Multilateralism is wasteful in incentives, as the same agreement is offered to all states regardless of their compliance costs. Bilateralism mitigates this problem by allowing for more tailored agreements but in the process multiplies transaction costs by requiring many of them. We use a formal model to generate propositions on the design of “lateralism” and the related issue of membership size, and offer illustrations in the context of four regimes: foreign direct investment, human rights, climate change, and international trade.

“Understanding IO Legitimation”

Submitted as the part of the volume Principals or Principles? Theoretical Synthesis in the Study of International Organizations, edited by Michael Tierney and Catherine Weaver. Under review at Cornell University Press.

“Scaling Up: Applying Lower-Level Theories to International Relations”

Scholars of international relations frequently borrow theoretical arguments from lower levels of human activity.  I identify two modes by which such ‘scaling up’ is conducted: the use of analogies and metaphors, and the borrowing of more complex models and theories.  While this practice can be fruitful, scaling up threatens what I term multi-scale validity in three ways.  First, an aggregation problem occurs when we treat states as actors.  Second, concepts and mechanisms may no longer be appropriate in the social context of a new domain.  Third, changes in the substantive nature of issues makes the use of apparently similar theories misleading when transferred to the international level.  I use examples from the literature on international cooperation and institutions to illustrate both the practice of scaling up and the potential problems.