Following 9/11, Americans’ fears of terrorists, especially domestically based Islamic extremists, reached near-hysteria levels. The federal government launched more covert operations in the name of fighting terrorist adversaries than they did in the entirety of the forty-five year Cold War. The scale of these efforts has been enormous, yet somehow Americans remain fearful of what they perceive to be a massive terrorist threat. But just how well-founded is this fear?

In Chasing Ghosts, two of the leading critics of the national security state show that it has not, statistically speaking, been efficient or successful, to say the least. Only one alarm in 10,000 has proven to be a legitimate threat, the rest are what John Mueller and Mark Stewart refer to as “ghosts.” Mueller and Stewart contend that the “ghost chase” that occupies American law enforcement and fuels federal spending persists because the public has been lead to believe that the terrorism threat is significant.

Despite the statistically low risk and the extraordinary amount of resources put towards combatting threats, Americans still worry and the government still spends billions. Mueller and Stewart argue that, until the true threat of domestic terrorism is understood, the country cannot begin to confront whether our pursuit of “ghosts” is truly worth the cost.

Praise for “Chasing Ghosts”

“This terrific book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the U.S. War on Terror.”

- John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science University of Chicago

“This evidence-based exposé of the counterterrorism industry is witty and eye-opening, and offers a sound basis for intelligent policy and for our conception of the world we live in.”

- Steven Pinker Johnstone Professor of Psychology Harvard University

John Mueller is a political scientist at Ohio State University and at the Cato Institute. He is the author, co-author, or editor of 18 books and hundreds of scholarly and popular articles.

Mark G. Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering at The University of Newcastle, Australia. He has more than 25 years of experience in probabilistic risk and vulnerability assessment of infrastructure and security systems, and has published more than 400 articles, papers and reports.

Order online at www.oup.com/us with promo code ASFLYQ6 to save 30%!
Introduction: Counting ghosts

The Ghosts 1. Official perceptions: The threat matrix
2. Public perceptions: Perpetual anxiety and war wariness
3. Terrorism and the United States
4. The foreign adversary and the myth of the mastermind

The Chase 5. Evaluating the counterterrorism enterprise
6. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
7. The National Security Agency
8. The Department of Homeland Security
9. Local and Airport police

Conclusion: Horrible imaginings and painted devils

From the Introduction:

In his memoir of his time as president, George W. Bush recalls a briefing he received from the director of the FBI a few weeks after the terrorist tragedy of September 11, 2001. The director informed him “that there were 331 potential al-Qaeda operatives inside the United States.”

Bush says his routine at the time was to pepper such reports with questions. However, when writing his book nearly a decade later, he apparently did not feel it useful to reflect critically (or ironically) on the director’s impressive and remarkably precise number. If he had, he would likely have concluded that virtually all of the 331 envisioned terrorists turned out to be ghosts.

Over the next year, the official ghost count rose considerably. Intelligence sources were soon telling rapt and uncritical reporters—and presumably the President of the United States—that the number of trained al-Qaeda operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000. However, scarcely any of these have ever been unearthed. The government has been far better at counting al-Qaeda operatives in the country than at finding them.

Impelled by such extravagant perceptions of threat, there have been great increases in spending on policing and intelligence to chase (and count) terrorists in the U.S. By 2009 there were something like 1,074 federal government organizations and almost 2,000 private companies devoted to counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence spread over more than 17,000 locations within the country. Collectively this apparatus has launched far more covert operations in the aftermath of 9/11 than it had during the entire 45 years of the Cold War. Indeed, the United States has created or reorganized more than two entire counterterrorism organizations for every terrorist arrest or apprehension it has made of people plotting to do damage within the country.

Central to this massive enterprise is what in the FBI has actually often come to be called “ghost-chasing.” Agencies like theirs, redirecting much of their effort from organized crime and white collar embezzlement, have kept their primary focus on terrorism. Overall, they have followed up on more than ten million tips or leads—or “threats” as they are called internally—since 2001. And the vast majority of those deemed worthy of pursuit seem to have led to terrorist enterprises that were either trivial or at most aspirational. But the chase continues of course, because no one wants to be the one whose neglect somehow leads to another disaster—or in the casual hyperbole of an official at the FBI’s National Threat Center, “it’s the one you don’t take seriously that becomes the 9/11.”

Chasing ghosts is an expensive, exhausting, bewildering, chaotic, and paranoia-inducing process. At times, in fact, it seems to be an exercise in dueling delusions: a Muslim hothead has delusions about changing the world by blowing something up, and the authorities have delusions that he might actually be able to overcome his patent inadequacies to do so.

No defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective as long as people believe the threat from terrorism is massive, even existential. If Americans have come to believe that the chance every year of being killed by a terrorist is dangerously high rather than one in four million (which it actually is), they are unlikely to be moved by concerns about civil liberties infringements or about counterterrorism expenditures that are designed to keep, or to make, them safe. Thus to undo, or even modify, the vast security system that has burgeoned since 2001, one must assess not simply the costs and consequences of the system, but the premises that furnish its essential engine.

This book takes on that task. It seeks to evaluate—to put into sensible context—the premises that drive the vast policing and intelligence venture to counter terrorism within the United States. We do not argue that there is nothing for the ghost-chasers to find—the terrorist “adversary” is real and does exist. The question that is central to the exercise, but one the ghost-chasers never really probe, is an important and rather straight-forward one: is the chase worth the effort? Or is it excessive given a serious evaluation of the danger that terrorism actually presents?

Website: http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/CG.pdf
John Mueller, bbbb@osu.edu       Mark G. Stewart, mark.stewart@newcastle.edu.au
Book Forum, April 4, 2016, Cato Institute, C-SPAN http://www.cato.org/events/chasing-ghosts-policing-terrorism
Podcasts: www.decodedc.com/105/
       www.libertarianism.org/media/free-thoughts/what-are-risks-terrorism#.gue8fv:zovA