Secret without Reason and Costly without Accomplishment:
Questioning the National Security Agency’s Metadata Program

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Introduction

When Edward Snowden’s revelations emerged in June 2013 about the extent to which the National Security Agency was secretly gathering communications data as part of the country’s massive 9/11-induced effort to catch terrorists, the administration of Barack Obama set in motion a program to pursue him to the ends of the earth in order to have him prosecuted to the full extent of the law for illegally exposing state secrets.

However, the President also said that the discussions about the programs these revelations triggered have actually been a good thing: “I welcome this debate. And I think it’s healthy for our democracy. I think it’s a sign of maturity because probably five years ago, six years ago, we might not have been having this debate.”

There may be something a bit patronizing in the implication that the programs have been secret because we weren’t yet mature enough to debate them when they were put into place. Setting that aside, however, a debate is surely to be welcomed—indeed, much overdue. It should be conducted not only about the National Security Agency’s amazingly extensive data-gathering programs to amass information on telephone and e-mail conversations—programs that have, according to the President, included “modest encroachments” on privacy—but also more generally about the phenomenal expansion of intelligence and policing efforts in the wake of 9/11.

As Dana Priest and William Arkin have documented in their the remarkable book, *Top Secret America:* by 2009 there were something like 1,074 federal government organizations and almost 2,000 private companies devoted to counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence spread over more than 17,000 locations within the country. At least 263 of these were created or reorganized after 9/11. Collectively this apparatus launched far more covert operations in the aftermath of 9/11 than it had during the entire 45 years of the Cold War.

A comparison might be useful. Since 9/11, 53 cases have come to light of Islamist extremist terrorism, whether based in the United States or abroad, in which the United States itself has been, or apparently has been, targeted. The total number of real terrorists, would-be terrorists, and putative terrorists populating this set of cases, excluding FBI and police undercover operatives, is less than 100. Thus, the United States has created or reorganized *three entire counterterrorism organizations* for every terrorist arrest or apprehension it has made of people plotting to do damage within the country.

Although much of discussion in this article can be extrapolated more widely, it focuses primarily—and for starters—on one of the two surveillance programs revealed by Snowden. These two programs have often been mixed in, or confused, with each other.

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1 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, *Statement by the President*, June 7, 2013, Fairmont Hotel, San Jose, California.
4 See John Mueller (ed.), *Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases* (Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 2013).
5 A useful discussion of the two programs is Walter Pincus, “NSA should be debated on the facts,” washingtonpost.com, July 29, 2013. On “known or unknown,” see the Opinion of Judge Claire V. Eagan, United
One of them, Prism, somewhat more commonly known from its section in the law as 702, permits NSA to gather electronic communication information on e-mail and phone conversations after approval by a judge if the target is both outside the United States and not an American citizen and if there is an appropriate and documented foreign intelligence purpose for the collection.

The other, known as 215, authorizes the gathering in bulk of business and communication records within the United States. It has been used in particular to amass telephone billing records—numbers called, numbers received, and conversation length—for every telephone in the U.S. In principle, the 215 data are only supposed to be collected if there are “reasonable grounds to believe” the records are “relevant” to a terrorist investigation of a “known or unknown” terrorist organization or operative. Creatively expanding the word “relevant” to the breaking point, it has been taken in practice to mean that NSA can gather billing records for every telephone conversation in the country: if there might be a known or unknown needle in the haystack, the entire haystack becomes “relevant.” As many, including Senator Patrick Leahy, have pointed out, this broad approach could also be applied to banking, credit card, medical, financial, and library records, all of which could be held as reasonably to be somehow “relevant” to the decidedly wide-ranged quest to catch terrorists.

The information gathered by either program can be held for five years.

This article primarily deals with the 215 program, the more controversial of the two, the one that involves the massive gathering of telephone billing records, or “metadata,” within the United States.

In the debate that has burgeoned since Snowden’s revelations, a number of questions have been raised about the civil liberties and privacy implications of NSA’s massive surveillance efforts. This article focuses on three additional questions. None of these is terribly legalistic, but they are questions that ought to be given more thorough examination.

The first two—why was the program secret and how much does it cost?—seem never to come up even though they are crucial if we are going to have an adult conversation on the issue. The third—what has the program accomplished?—has attracted some attention, but it clearly needs much more, and this article examines it in the broader context of the obsessive, and massively expensive, efforts by police and intelligence since 9/11 to deal with the threat that is envisioned to be presented by terrorism, a quest that has involved following literally millions of leads that go nowhere.6

Although those opposed to the program are deeply concerned about privacy issues, they have also argued that the program fails to be “an effective counterterrorism tool,” in the words of Senator Patrick Leahy.7 In December 2013, two judges came to opposite conclusions about the 215 metadata program, and it is clear the program’s effectiveness figured importantly in their decisions. Judge Richard J. Leon, in finding the program was likely unconstitutional, noted that the government “does not cite a single instance” in which analysis of bulk metadata collection

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“actually stopped an imminent attack,” failed to present “any indication of a concrete danger,” and provided “no proof that the program prevented terrorist attacks.”

Eleven days later, Judge William Pauley, in approving the program, stressed in his first sentence that the world is “dangerous and interconnected” and went on to insist that the effectiveness of the data collection program “cannot seriously be disputed,” noting that “the Government has acknowledged several successes in Congressional testimony and in declarations.”

Meanwhile, a special Presidential group set up to review the NSA programs, while dwelling mostly on legal issues, also noted, in recommending the termination of 215, that information provided by the program “was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner” otherwise, and that “there has been no instance in which NSA could say with confidence that the outcome would have been different” without the program.

In all this, the key question, as the Presidential review group points out, is not whether a surveillance program “makes us incrementally safer, but whether the additional safety is worth the sacrifice in terms of individual privacy, personal liberty, and public trust.”

The analysis in this article suggests that any benefit of the 215 metadata program is considerably outweighed by its cost even assuming that the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, cost figure is quite small. If the issue is security versus privacy, in this case privacy wins.

**Why was the 215 program secret?**

Under Executive Order 135256, classification is permitted if “disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism.” The order continues: “If there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified.” There is also a classification level of top secret. As defined in Executive Order 12356, top secret is “applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.”

It is difficult to see how earlier exposure of the program’s existence would have damaged national security, gravely or otherwise. No one seems to be saying that the Snowden documents put undercover intelligence operatives or operations overseas or elsewhere in danger of being exposed, or that they reveal military secrets about weapons, or that they compromise United States strategy or tactics. Instead, we get such vague, atmospheric pronouncements to the press as that from outgoing FBI Director Robert Mueller in August 2013: “Mueller said that leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden ‘have impacted, and [are] in the process of impacting,

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13 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, 10n.
Mueller and Stewart: Secret without Reason and Costly without Accomplishment

capabilities around the world,’ but when asked to expand on this, he said simply, ‘No details.’

Even less helpful has been the expression of “belief” promulgated by NSA chief Keith B.
Alexander: “Based on what we know to date, we believe these disclosures have caused
significant and irreversible harm to the security of the nation.”

In fact, of course, terrorists have surely known at least since the 1990s (when Osama bin
Laden ceased talking on a satellite phone) that United States intelligence is searching
communications worldwide to track them down. Year after year we have heard about “chatter”
that has been picked up by official agencies, and one certainly has to conclude that it has dawned
on the chatterers that there are extensive efforts to listen in. The terrorists may not know the
precise number, but they are likely to be at least dimly aware—and are unlikely to be surprised—
that the NSA, in its tireless quest to conduct its very global war on terror intercepts and ingests
1.7 billion communication elements every day. These include, note Priest and Arkin, “telephone
calls, radio signals, cell phone conversations, emails, text and Twitter messages, bulletin board
postings, instant messages, website changes, computer network pings, and IP addresses.”

It is possible that the current revelations will impress the terrorists even further about the extent of the
surveillance effort. But even if that is so, the effect would mainly be to make their efforts to
communicate even more difficult and inconvenient.

Conceivably, as some maintain, there still exist some exceptionally dim-witted terrorists
or would-be terrorists who are oblivious to the fact that their communications are rather less than
fully secure. But such supreme knuckle-heads are surely likely to make so many mistakes—like
advertising on Facebook or searching there or in chatrooms for co-conspirators—that
sophisticated and costly communications data banks are scarcely needed to track them down.

Some defenders of the program have creatively argued that exposure of the 215 program
has aided terrorists because they now know that NSA is gathering only metadata on telephone
calls in the United States, not their content. But, if terrorists or other bad people read past the
first paragraph in discussions of the 215 program, they surely can also note that, if information
gathered is deemed suspicious, investigators can apply for legal authority to record the content of
the communications. And they can do that readily as well in the 702 program which gathers and
monitors not only metadata, but also content. Moreover, like many others, terrorists are likely to
suspect that, despite prominent denials to the contrary, considerably more than metadata is
gathered even under the 215 program.

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August 22, 2013.
16 Mary Lu Carnevale, “Tracking Use of Bin Laden’s Satellite Phone,” Washington Wire, blogs.wsj.com, May 28,
2008.
17 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, 77.
18 See, for example, cases 16, 30, 39, 40, 41, 48, 51, and 52 in Mueller, Terrorism Since 9/11.
19 Thus, General Michael Hayden on “Meet the Press,” NBC, June 16, 2013: “What I fear al-Qaeda learns about this
program is not what we’re allowed to do but they learn what we’re not allowed to do, and they learn the limits of the
program.” Asked on CBS’ “Face the Nation” on June 30, 2013, about what harm had been done, Hayden said,
“Look, we cooperate with a lot of governments around the world. They expect us to be discreet about that
cooperation. I can't imagine a government anywhere on the planet who now believes we can keep a secret.”
Although that “harm” is a relevant concern for programs that are secret, it is scarcely relevant to the issue of why the
program was made secret in the first place. Updating his opinion on “Face the Nation” on December 28, 2013,
Hayden declared that the NSA had become “infinitely weaker” because of the disclosures.
It is also argued that the program was kept secret in order to protect the private communications companies, like AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint, that are dutifully supplying the NSA with data. However, the potential embarrassment of businesses is not usually deemed to constitute a threat, grave or otherwise, to national security.

Unkind people might suggest that the real reason these programs were kept secret actually stems from the administration’s fear that public awareness of their “modest encroachments” on privacy would make further efforts to encroach more difficult. Thus, Reuters notes that a former Air Force secretary ominously warns that a “growing unease about domestic surveillance could have a chilling effect on proposed cyber legislation that calls for greater information-sharing between government and industry.” And it also notes that, after the revelations, more lawmakers signed on to legislation that would strengthen the privacy protections in the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act.20 Perhaps, then, the programs were kept secret not so much to protect people from terrorism, but to protect the government from the annoying and inconvenient public and Congressional outcry that, as it happens, constitutes the untidy stuff of democracy.

How much does the 215 program cost?

If we are now to have a healthy debate about 215, NSA’s stupendous megadata program, it seems reasonable to suggest that debaters should be supplied with information about how much the program costs. This information would furnish a key starting point for any debate. Presumably, that figure has thus far been classified because the program itself was classified. But now that we know only too well that the program exists, why should its cost remain secret? It is certainly difficult to see how knowing that cost would help the terrorists.

It’s possible, however, that the figure for the program remains undisclosed in part because no one actually knows how much the program costs. That this phenomenon is widespread is suggested by Priest and Arkin. In researching their book, they discovered that the spending increases on counterterrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 often took place so fast and so chaotically that no one was able to keep a count of the costs.21

Program, investigatory, and opportunity costs

The direct costs of maintaining the 215 program might be quite low. However, a full accounting should include not only the actual cost of gathering and storing the surveillance data, but also the costs of constantly sorting through it to generate and develop leads. According to the NSA’s director of compliance, the agency queries its databases about 20 million times each month.22 Presumably that includes both databases and, equally presumably, it involves a great deal of human interaction, all of which must be paid for.

Costs should also include those involved in following up the leads once they have been generated, an issue to be discussed in the next section of this article.

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21 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, xviii-xix.
Also included in the tally should be the opportunity costs: what else could the money have been used for? For example, it has often been noted that there has been a downgrading by the FBI and other agencies of other priorities, including the pursuit of white collar crime like fraudulent banking practices, to focus on the pursuit of (substantially non-existent) terrorists. To fully evaluate the costs of the NSA surveillance efforts, one would need to take this issue into account.

**Privacy costs: the issue of trust**

In addition, some consideration should be made for the less quantifiable costs of privacy invasion and for the potential misuse of the data.

Although the program has built-in safeguards, its operation ultimately requires us to trust those in charge. Citing unpleasant historical precedents from the days of Richard Nixon and J. Edgar Hoover and from the runup to the Iraq War of 2003, Stephen Walt has arrestingly suggested, or warned, that the program could be used to intimidate or harass whistle-blowers, dissidents, and overly-inquisitive journalists: “once someone raises their head above the parapet and calls attention to themselves by challenging government policy, they can’t be sure that someone inside government won’t take umbrage and try to see what dirt they can find.”

That wary reaction has been enhanced by the fact that officials have several times been caught in lies—or supreme exercises in Clintonian sophistry—about the NSA programs.

There is, for example, the response of NSA director Alexander to a March 2012 cover story in *Wired* magazine that reported the views of William Binney, a former NSA official who contended that, without a warrant, the NSA was collecting “a vast trove of international and domestic billing records” from major American telephone companies and that “they’re storing everything they gather.” In the ensuing months, Alexander blithely denied Binney’s contention. “To think we’re collecting on every US person…that would be against the law…. The fact is we’re a foreign intelligence agency.” He also categorically insisted that “we don’t hold data on U.S. citizens,” a statement that has been defended by the administration on the grounds that the NSA’s internal definition of “data” does not include “metadata”—a language-stretching nuance Alexander neglected to mention when he made his statement. As it happens, however, the agency’s actual internal definition of “data” *does* specifically include “call event records and other Digital Network Intelligence metadata.”

Then, in March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was asked by Senator Ron Wyden in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundred of millions of Americans?” Even knowing that Wyden, due to his position on the committee, knew what the answer to that question was, Clapper blandly demurred: “No, sir…. Not wittingly.” Wyden says he had sent the question to Clapper’s office the day before and that Clapper was also given a chance later to amend his answer. After Snowden’s revelations three months later spectacularly shattered Clapper’s crisp denial (as well

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23 Stephen Walt, “The real threat behind the NSA surveillance programs,” foreignpolicy.com, June 10, 2013. See also Sanchez, “Decoding the Summer of Snowden.”
as Alexander’s earlier ones), Clapper sent a letter to the Committee stating that his answer had been “clearly erroneous” and that when responding he imagined that the question referred to content, not metadata which he somehow believes the NSA does not collect “wittingly.” Clapper has also said that an honest response would have required him to divulge secrets that were highly classified, and thus he came up with the “least untruthful” answer he could imagine at the time.\(^\text{27}\)

There is additional evidence of deception in the disclosure that the NSA illegally collected email content data on thousands, or tens of thousands, of Americans before that practice was closed down by the courts in 2011.\(^\text{28}\) The court’s opinion on this was classified, and the Obama administration fought a Freedom of Information lawsuit seeking to get it released.\(^\text{29}\) In the wake of the Snowden disclosures, however, the opinion was finally declassified and released in heavily redacted form. In it, the judge specifically points out that he had previously been the victim of “a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection program” and that the information gathered had been “fundamentally different from what the court had been led to believe.”\(^\text{30}\)

Similar concerns were raised in a 2009 ruling that had originally been classified as top secret dealing with the way the NSA probed phone numbers on an “alert list.” When it was finally declassified under pressure in 2013, the ruling included declarations that the government had failed to comply with the court’s orders and had compounded this by “repeatedly submitting inaccurate descriptions of the alert process” and that court-approved privacy safeguards had “been so frequently and systematically violated” that they “never functioned effectively.” A senior official explained rather lamely, but entirely plausibly, that any violations were “unintentional” because “there was nobody at N.S.A. who really had a full understanding of how the program was operating at the time.”\(^\text{31}\)

It might be wondered, then, what intentional violations, keeping Walt’s admonition in mind, could lead to. Senator Dianne Feinstein, who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, insists that her committee “has never identified an instance in which the NSA has intentionally abused its authority to conduct surveillance for inappropriate purposes.” However, the agency’s director of compliance, has indicated that there have been a very small number (perhaps one every five years) of “willful errors.”\(^\text{32}\)

Relevant as well to a discussion of credibility is the disclosure that in 2006 the NSA deliberately weakened an encryption standard accepted both nationally and internationally in a systematic effort to defeat privacy protections for Internet communications, a venture that compromised the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the process.\(^\text{33}\)

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\(^{27}\) Robinson, “We can handle the truth on NSA spying.” See also Bamford, “They Know Much More Than You Think.”


\(^{29}\) Gellman, “NSA broke privacy rules.”

\(^{30}\) Ellen Nakashima, “NSA gathered thousands of Americans’ e-mails.”


\(^{32}\) Savage, “N.S.A. Calls Violations of Privacy, ‘Miniscule.’”

\(^{33}\) Shane, “Court Upbraided N.S.A. on Its Use of Call-Log Data.” Sanchez, “Decoding the Summer of Snowden.”
In all this, an assessment of the privacy costs attendant on the NSA’s surveillance efforts should hold in mind, to the degree to which they apply, warnings about an intimidation factor is suggested in this passage from George Orwell’s novel, *1984*:

> There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. 34

**What has the 215 program accomplished?**

Once one knows the cost of the program, one is in a position to weigh that figure against the benefit the program has generated. The President insists that the privacy-encroaching programs “help us prevent terrorist attacks” and therefore “on net, it was worth us doing.” 35 However, they are worth us doing only if their benefit, on net, outweighs their cost—if any gains in security are enough to justify the privacy and other costs. 36 And that is a calculation that should be made, not simply declared.

**The 9/11 atmosphere: consequences and persistence**

To begin an appraisal of this issue, one must assess the program in context. It has been only one cog in the massive intelligence-gathering machine impelled by the trauma of 9/11. The trauma is certainly understandable. But the fears, and therefore the hasty and expensive actions they inspired, have clearly been substantially inflated. As anthropologist Scott Atran puts it, “Perhaps never in the history of human conflict have so few people with so few actual means and capabilities frightened so many.” 37

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, recalls Rudy Giuliani, who was mayor of New York at the time, “anybody, any one of these security experts, including myself, would have told you on September 11, 2001, we’re looking at dozens and dozens and multiyears of attacks like this.” 38 Such fears and concerns were, of course, plausible extrapolations from the facts then at hand. However, that every “security expert” should hold such erroneous views is fundamentally absurd. It was also an entirely plausible extrapolation from facts then at hand that 9/11 could prove to be an aberration rather than a harbinger. 39 Yet it appears that no one in

34 Quoted, Bamford, “They Know Much More Than You Think.”
authority could even imagine that proposition to be true even though it could have been taken to fit the available information fully as well as the passionately-embraced alarmist perspective. At any rate, operating under that apparently unanimous mentality, US intelligence extravagantly imagined that the number of trained al-Qaeda operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.40

Over the years, such thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways, and it has proved to be notably resistant to counter-information. Indeed, officials often seem to live in what might be called “I think, therefore they are” denial.41 Thus, on February 11, 2003, a year and a half after 9/11, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee that “the greatest threat is from al-Qaeda cells in the US that we have not yet identified.” He somehow judged the threat from those unidentified entities to be “increasing” and claimed to know that “al-Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the US with little warning.” On February 16, 2005, he testified before the same committee that he remained “very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text.42 By that time, however, an FBI report had concluded that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, it had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States.43

Since the number of al-Qaeda operatives actually in the country came out to be zero or nearly so, and since the threat of terrorism in the country proved to be far more limited than initially feared—not even one of the “dozens and dozens” of attacks like 9/11 ever materialized of course—there might logically have been some judicious cutbacks to the funds devoted to dealing with the issue in subsequent years. Far overdue, clearly, are extensive and transparently-presented studies seeking rationally to evaluate the massive increases in homeland security expenditures that have taken place since 9/11—increases that total well over $1 trillion. But virtually none of this has been done by the administrators in charge.44 Instead, initial, if clearly alarmist, perspectives have been essentially maintained and the vast and hasty increases in spending on homeland security continue to be perpetuated.

Important in this have been increases in intelligence and policing as the questing enterprise, central to which is the NSA, continues to be expanded, searching for the needle by adding more and more hay.

In the process, information has been folded into a “Threat Matrix,” an itemized catalogue of all the “threats”—or more accurately “leads”—needing to be followed up. As Garrett Graff explains, the government pursues “upwards of 5,000 threats per day.”45 Impelled by what some have called “The 9/11 Commission Syndrome”—an obsession with the career dangers in failing “to connect the dots”—it is in no one’s interest to cull the threats “because it was possible you’d cull the wrong threat and end up, after the next attack, at the green felt witness table before the

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41 On this issue, see also Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion.”
42 Director Mueller’s testimony can be found at www.fbi.gov/congress/congress.htm.
44 For a discussion, see Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, 1-9.
next congressional inquiry." Consequently, the Threat Matrix “tracks all the unfolding terrorist plots and intelligence rumors” and is “filled to the brim with whispers, rumors, and vacuous, unconfirmed information.” In result, “claims that ordinarily wouldn’t have made it past the intake agent, claims that wouldn’t even be written down weeks earlier, suddenly became the subject of briefs to the President in the Oval Office.” Graff supplies an example. One entry in the Threat Matrix is crisply cited as “a threat from the Philippines to attack the United States unless blackmail money was paid.” It turns out that this entry was based on an e-mail that said, “Dear America. I will attack you if you don’t pay me 999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 dollars. MUHAHAHA.”

If, aided by the Threat Matrix, the government pursues some 5000 “threats” or leads each day, and if each lead takes an average of a half a week to investigate, the FBI has pursued some six million or more of them over the years since 9/11—a process that has led to, at the very most, a few hundred prosecutions, most of them on quite minor charges.

Moreover, whatever the ratio of needle to hay, living with the Threat Matrix seems to take a psychological toll on its daily readers. As Graff vividly describes the process, the Threat Matrix comes off as “a catalogue of horrors,” as the “daily looming prognoses of Armageddon,” and as “a seeming tidal wave of Islamic extremist anger that threatened to unhinge American society,” and it could become “all-consuming and paralyzing”—as one reader puts it, “Your mind comes to be dominated by the horrific consequences of low-probability events.” In essence, it is like being barricaded in an apartment and listening only to the police radio. Or one reader offers another comparison: “Reading the Threat Matrix every day is like being stuck in a room listening to loud Led Zeppelin music,” and, after a while, you begin to suffer from “sensory overload” and become “paranoid” about the threat. Recalls former CIA Director George Tenet, “You could drive yourself crazy believing all or even half of what was in it.”

As Jack Goldsmith, another reader, stresses, “It is hard to overstate the impact that the incessant waves of threat reports have on the judgment of people inside the executive branch who are responsible for protecting American lives.” He quotes Tenet, “You simply could not sit where I did and read what passed across by desk on a daily basis and be anything other than scared to death about what it portended.” This, writes Goldsmith, captures “the attitude of every person I knew who regularly read the threat matrix.” Every person. Goldsmith’s account suggests that the sheer number of “threats,” combined with the fact that these scarcely ever lead to anything, never inspired analysts and policymakers to consider the rather plausible, if arguable, conclusion that there was little or nothing out there to fear. Rather, it caused them—exclusively it seems—to embrace the dead opposite: “The want of actionable intelligence

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46 Graff, Threat Matrix, 400.
47 Graff, Threat Matrix, 345.
48 Graff, Threat Matrix, 344.
49 Graff, Threat Matrix, 398. Graff reports that the FBI dutifully ran down the e-mail’s author and sent information to Philippine police who then paid a visit to the would-be extortionist’s parents.
51 Graff, Threat Matrix, 19, 489, 345, 400.
53 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 232.
54 Jack Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, 72.
combined with a knowledge of what might happen produced an aggressive, panicked attitude that assumed the worst about threats.” George Tenet agrees when he talks about “the palpable fear that we felt on the basis of the fact that there was so much we did not know.” Present fears,” observes Macbeth, “are less than horrible imaginings.” Or, in today’s lingo, “Absence of evidence is evidence of existence.”

The NSA: efforts and accomplishments

In the panicky aftermath of 9/11, the National Security Agency, the institution of central concern here, has also expanded massively, and its computerized surveillance programs have been a central part of that process. As of 2011, the floor space it occupied matched that of the Pentagon.

It is important to evaluate what these programs have accomplished in order to determine whether “on net” they have been “worth us doing” in their central mission of countering terrorism.

When asked in June 2013 at Senate hearings if NSA’s massive data-gathering programs were “crucial or critical” in disrupting terrorist threats, the agency’s head, General Keith Alexander, doggedly testified that in “dozens” of instances the databases “helped” or were “contributing”—though he did seem to agree with the word “critical” at one point. The key issue for evaluating the programs, however, given their costs and privacy implications, would be to determine not whether the huge databases were helpful or contributing, but whether they were necessary.

After his testimony, Alexander provided Congress a list of terrorism cases in which his surveillance measures have helped to disrupt terrorist plots or to identify suspects. The list reportedly numbers 54—unsurprisingly, the list itself is classified. On the surface, this seems to be an amazingly small number for several years’ work. There have been hundreds of terrorism cases in the United States since 9/11. Some 53 of these, as noted earlier, have led to full-bore prosecutions for plotting to attack targets in the United States. And there are dozens more that have led to prosecutions for sending, or plotting to send, support to terrorists overseas, while a few hundred have involved terrorism investigations that led to prosecutions on lesser charges. There have also been hundreds—or perhaps even thousands—of terrorism cases overseas outside of war zones. If the NSA programs were so valuable, one would think that investigators on just about every case would routinely run their information by the NSA. The exercise would be helpful even if the NSA comes up blank because that would allow investigators to close off some avenues of potential investigation that, if pursued, would have proven to be a waste of time and effort, allowing them to follow leads more likely to be productive.

55 Jack Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, 74.
56 60 Minutes (CBS), May 1, 2007.
57 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, 74.
59 NSA operatives sometimes suggest the program “ultimately completes the picture” or, in the words of FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce, “closes the gap” on information on a case. These formulations ingeniously, if deceptively, create the impression that the information was necessary. Ellen Nakashima, “NSA cites case as success of phone data-collection program,” Washington Post, August 8, 2013.
60 See Mueller, Terrorism Since 9/11.
That they apparently have not done so suggests either that investigators and prosecutors have only occasionally found the NSA to be a helpful ally or else that they were afraid that, if they queried the NSA on the case at hand, the agency would spew out a raft of leads that would unproductively clutter and distract their investigation while greatly increasing its costs.

The experience at the FBI with NSA leads is likely relevant here. Explains Walter Pincus, if operatives at NSA, sorting through their 215 metadata collection or other sources, uncover “a questionable pattern” such as “calls to other suspect phones,” they send a report to the FBI for investigation.61 In NSA this process has sometimes been called “We Track ‘Em, You Whack ‘Em.”62 The FBI, then, is routinely supplied with what Graff calls “endless lists of ‘suspect’ telephone numbers.” When followed up, these “leads” virtually never go anywhere: of 5000 numbers passed along, only 10—two-tenths of one percent—“panned out enough for the bureau to bother” to get court permission to follow them up. At the FBI, the NSA tips are often called “Pizza Hut” leads because, following them up, FBI agents “inevitably end up investigating the local pizza delivery guy.” There is, in other words, nothing to “whack.” At one point, the generally diplomatic Robert Mueller bluntly told NSA director Alexander, “You act like this is some treasure trove; it’s a useless time suck.” An agent in the trenches puts it a bit less delicately: “You know how long it takes to chase 99 pieces of bullshit?”63

The cases

According to the testimony of an NSA official, of the 54 cases that were supposedly disrupted by NSA surveillance data, more than 90 percent involved information from the 702, or Prism, program which allows the NSA to intercept communications by targets abroad after obtaining judicial approval.64 Thus, the 215 program, in which metadata are accumulated and stored for all telephone calls within the United States, presumably played a role only in around 5 cases over the course of the program. According to General Alexander, only 13 of the 54 cases on the classified list had a “homeland nexus,” the others having occurred in Europe (25), in Asia (11), and in Africa (5).65

Four of the cases, all presumably included in the “homeland nexus” subset, were publically discussed in Congressional testimony on June 18, 2013, by Alexander and by Sean Joyce, Deputy Director of the FBI.66 Insofar as NSA surveillance played a role at all in these cases, it seems that it was the 702 program, not the 215 one, that was relevant.67

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61 Pincus, “NSA should be debated on the facts.”
63 Graff, Threat Matrix, 527.
64 Pincus, “NSA should be debated on the facts.”
66 A related justification for the data storage program holds that, if it had been in place in 2001, it could have led to finding the location of one of the 9/11 hijackers who was calling a safe house in Yemen from San Diego. This instance plays an important role in Judge Pauley’s “Memorandum & Order” of December 2013 upholding the surveillance programs. However, insofar as this justification is valid, it would have been the 702 program that was relevant, not the 215 program. Moreover, the CIA already was tracking the man’s communications and knew he had entered the United States. It also knew about the calls to the safe house, but failed to trace the calls even though it had both the ability and authority to do so. It did not need a vast data bank. Michael German, “No NSA Poster Child: The Real Story of 9/11 Hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar,” defenseone.com, October 16, 2013. Justin Elliott, “Judge on NSA Case Cites 9/11 Report, But It Doesn’t Actually Support His Ruling,” prorepublica.org, December
Although the full array of cases remains classified, Senator Patrick Leahy has said that the notion that these cases represent disrupted plots is “plainly wrong.” Indeed, “they weren’t all plots and they weren’t all thwarted.”

Only one, it appears, relied on the 215 program in any significant way. It is among the four disclosed ones, and it involves a San Diego cab driver from Somalia who has been convicted of sending the decidedly non-princely sum of $8,500 to help a designated terrorist group in Somalia fight Ethiopians who, with US support, had recently invaded the country. The government had been tapping his telephone for months, and Director Mueller appears to have singled out this case as the only one in which the collection of phone data had been “instrumental,” a word, of course, that is not as strong as “crucial” or “critical” or “necessary.” Joyce says that an investigation of the potential case using 215 information that began in October 2007 “did not find any connection to terrorist activity,” but that there was a breakthrough when NSA connected a San Diego number with a suspicious contact outside the country using 215. However, it is not clear they needed any sort of data bank to sort through. Says Senator Ron Wyden, investigators had all the information they needed to get a court order to investigate.

A correspondent for The Hill breathlessly characterizes the cab driver culprit as “a top terrorist financier in San Diego, who was supporting militant extremist groups in Somalia.” However, it certainly appears that the crime prosecuted at great effort and cost was, overall, a rather trivial one.

The second disclosed case seems to be even more trivial. It involves three Muslim men, all naturalized American citizens, one in Kansas City and two in New York. At the time of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, they decided they needed to fight for their “faith and community,” in the words of one of them. Four years later, one of the men was able to connect to two apparently experienced al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen. Hoping to join the fight in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia, the American men sent money and equipment to their new friends in Yemen under the impression that these would be set aside for their military training. Over several months they sent thousands of dollars—one of them says it totaled more than $23,000—as well as watches, cold-weather gear, some Garmin GPS units, and a remote-controlled toy car. However, the recipients divided the physical loot among themselves and spent the money on (real) cars and as awards to families of Islamic martyrs. In 2008, the scam artists requested further payments of $45,000 which one of them planned to use to open an appliance store. They also suggested that the Americans were better suited to an operation in the United States and cajoled one of them into casing the New York Stock Exchange for a possible bombing—a “plot” that they never had any intention of carrying out, according to the testimony of one of them. The American did do a walk around the target, and then, several months later, submitted a one-page

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28, 2013.

68 German, “No NSA Poster Child.”
71 Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
72 Nakashima, “NSA cites case.”
73 Muñoz, “NSA chief cites 50 foiled plots.”
report on his adventure consisting of information that could have been gotten from Google maps and from tourist brochures. It was summarily trashed in disgust by his handlers.74

In his June 2013 testimony, Joyce said identification in the case was made not through 215, but through “702 authority.”75 At the same time, he raised interest, and then eyebrows, by dramatically proclaiming this to be a case “that was in the very initial stages of plotting to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.” However, when asked whether the plot was “serious,” Joyce deftly dodged the issue: “I think the jury considered it serious because they were all convicted.” As it happens, there were no jury trials: the three men all pleaded guilty and then only to providing support to terrorism, not to the NYSE plot (such as it was). According another official, FBI Deputy Director Joyce “misspoke.”76

The third disclosed case involves an American who had done surveillance work (the value of which seems to have been fairly limited) for terrorist gunmen who killed 166 in a suicidal rampage in Mumbai, India, in 2008. He was later arrested as he was engaged in a plot to do terrorist damage in Denmark, a plot that was beset by many planning and financial difficulties at the time. According to ProPublica reporter Sebastian Rotella who has done extensive research and reporting on the case, British intelligence already had the American under surveillance—suggesting that the Danish enterprise would never have been allowed to be carried out. The arrest resulted from a tip from the British, not from NSA intercepts. It does appear, however, that previously stored NSA intercepts, presumably from the 702 program, aided in building the legal case against the man.77

Only the fourth disclosed case involves a serious potential for terrorism within the United States. This was the Zazi case of 2009 in which three Afghan-Americans received training in Pakistan and then returned to the United States plotting to set off bombs on the New York subway system.

Joyce testified that a connection was made through “702 authority.”78 But, as Justin Heilmann points out in a study of the episode and as others have more recently noted, the plot in the United States does not appear to have been disrupted so much by NSA data-dredgers but by standard surveillance procedures implemented after the British provided a hot tip about Zazi based on his e-mail traffic to a known overseas terrorist address that had long been under surveillance.79 At that point, US authorities had good reason to put the plotters on their radar

78 Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
and, as Senator Ron Wyden has pointed out, “the government had all the information it needed to go to the phone company and get an individual court order.” Having NSA’s megadata collection might have been helpful, but it seems scarcely to have been required.

Actually, it is not clear that even the tip was necessary. Given the perpetrators’ limited capacities, it is questionable whether the plot would have ever succeeded. For example, the plotters foolishly called attention to themselves by using stolen credit cards to purchase large quantities of potential bomb material thereby guaranteeing that the sales would be scrutinized and security camera information preserved. Moreover, even with his training and a set of notes at hand, Zazi, described by a step-uncle as “a dumb kid, believe me,” still apparently couldn’t figure it out, and he frantically contacted his overseas trainer for help several times. Each of these communications was “more urgent in tone than the last,” according to court documents. It was these communications that alerted the authorities.

When presenting his four cases at the Congressional hearings in June 2013, Alexander explained that he couldn’t make the details of all the cases on his secret list public because “If we give all those out, we give all the secrets of how we’re tracking down the terrorists as a community, and we can’t do that.” The remaining 50 will remain shrouded in secret then, presumably because it is believed that discussing them publicly would result in damage, perhaps even grave damage, to national security. Accordingly, so protected, we will never be able to examine them in our “healthy” debate on the issue of NSA surveillance.

Absent such information, and keeping in mind the impressive record of dissembling that NSA has so far amassed, it does seem to be a reasonable suspicion—supported by the public comments of Senator Leahy—that the four cases discussed represent not a random selection from the list, but the best they could come up with. If that is so, the achievements of 215 do seem to be decidedly underwhelming.

In this regard, one could also examine that set of case studies of the 53 post-9/11 plots that have come to light by Islamist terrorists to damage targets in the United States. Since these have resulted in public arrests and trials, there is quite a bit of information available about them. Overall, where the plots have been disrupted, the task was accomplished by ordinary policing methods. The NSA programs scarcely come up at all.

At the June 2013 hearings, one committee member, Representative Jim Himes of Connecticut, noting that his constituents were mainly concerned about 215, tried to get Alexander and Joyce to indicate how many plots would have been carried out but for that program. After some evasive answers, Himes, out of time, ended by expressing his “hope” that “you’ll elucidate for us specifically by case how many stopped terrorist attacks” the 215 role in this process, but is not at all clear that this is so or that, if so, its role was necessary. For a discussion, see Dan Amira, “Did Controversial NSA Spy Programs Really Help Prevent an Attack on the Subway?” nymag.com, June 10, 2013. Alexander has said that 702 was “critical,” but that 215 was not essential to the case: McCarthy, “NSA chief says exposure.” See also Peter Finn and Greg Miller, “How an e-mail address disrupted plots in Britain and U.S.” Washington Post, June 18, 2013; Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s secret spying unit and bin Laden’s Final Plot against America (New York: Touchstone, 2013), 53-55; Gillespie, “Do the Zazi and Headley Arrests?” Dilanian, “NSA faces backlash.”

Nakashima, “NSA cites case.” See also Finn and Miller, “How an e-mail address disrupted plots.”


Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mueller, Terrorism Since 9/11.
program was “essential to.”84 Leahy’s comments suggest that the answer to that question is perilously close to zero.85

Terminating 215

It certainly appears, then, that any benefit of the 215 metadata program is very limited and is considerably outweighed by its cost even assuming that the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, cost figure is quite small. That is, the program would very likely fail a full cost-benefit analysis handily even only minimally taking into consideration privacy and civil liberties concerns. Representative Adam Schiff has done his own “on net” assessment. Even if the program is “occasionally successful,” he concludes, “there’s still no justification that I can see for obtaining that amount of data in the first place.”86 Some officials have in fact acknowledged that the case for 215 is “less compelling” and “harder to make.”87

Although the cost of the 215 program remains classified, it is possible to calculate how much that cost would have to be for the program to be cost-effective. Even making some generous assumptions about its effectiveness, the program would be cost-effective only if its full price tag (including all the cost considerations arrayed above) is less than $33.3 million per year.88 The full NSA budget, for reference, is about $10 billion.

In the past, NSA has actually closed down such programs—though not without characteristic dissembling. That is, it was persuaded to conclude that some tools in its kit were not necessarily all that “essential and vital.” James Bamford reports that the agency had a nationwide program to store e-mail and Internet metadata in bulk for years. It was ended in 2011 for “operational and resource reasons,” according to the director of national intelligence. But, notes Bamford, a statement issued in 2013 by senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall contends that the real reason the program was shut down was that the NSA was “unable” to prove the usefulness of the operation. “We were very concerned about this program’s impact on Americans’ civil liberties and privacy rights,” they said, “and we spent a significant portion of 2011 pressing intelligence officials to provide evidence of its effectiveness. They were unable to do so, and the program was shut down that year.” The senators added, “It is also important to note that intelligence agencies made statements to both Congress and the [FISA court] that significantly exaggerated this program’s

84 Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
86 Nakashima, “NSA cites case.”
87 Finn and Miller, “How an e-mail address disrupted plots.”
88 It is assumed in this estimation that the 215 program is vital—is necessary to—the disruption of one plot every four years that, if successfully carried out, would result in the detonation of a very large improvised explosive device inflicting extensive damage to life and property costing $1 billion. This would be much larger than the car bomb that failed to detonate at Times Square in 2010. As noted, the 215 program has never done so in the past. Also assumed is that the chance the terrorist bomb would actually be successfully detonated in the undisrupted plot is 20 percent. On the (rather low) IED success rate for terrorists, see Matthew Grant and Mark G. Stewart, “A Systems Model for Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks,” International Journal of Intelligent Defence Support Systems, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012): 75-93.
effectiveness. This experience demonstrates to us that intelligence agencies’ assessment of the usefulness of particular collection program—even significant ones—are not always accurate.\(^89\)

It seems likely that “on net” (as the President puts it) the highly-controversial 215 program could also safely be retired for “operational and resource reasons” with little or no negative consequences to security as recommended in December 2013 by the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. If the 215 program has done little (and probably nothing) special to prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks in the United States, and if we are now having a healthy debate about the NSA programs, it seems reasonable to suggest that, even without full information about how the program costs, we are paying too much.

And, just possibly, there are other elements in the vast intelligence and policing empire spawned in panic and in unseemly haste after 9/11 that might also be retired.

\(^89\) Bamford, “They Know Much More Than You Think.” See also Clarke et al, *Liberty and Security in a Changing World*, 97. Further information at “Wyden, Udall Statement on the Disclosure of Bulk Email Records Collection Program,” press release, wyden.senate.gov, July 2, 2013, which also includes this observation: “We believe that the broader lesson here is that even though intelligence officials may be well intentioned, assertions from intelligence agencies about the value and effectiveness of particular programs should not simply be accepted at face value by policymakers or oversight bodies….It is up to Congress, the courts and the public to ask the tough questions and press even experienced intelligence officials to back their assertions up with actual evidence, rather than simply deferring to these officials’ conclusions without challenging them.”