INCENTIVES FOR RESTRAINT:
CANADA AS A NONNUCLEAR POWER

by John E. Mueller

IT was a certainty, C. P. Snow announced to a group of scientists in 1960, that “within, at the most, six years China and several other nations” would have “a stock of nuclear bombs.” “I am saying this as responsibly as I can,” he declared.¹

The problem of the spread of nuclear weapons—the “Nth country problem”—has given grave concern to many responsible and prescient people in the last two decades. Much of their analysis has centered on the incentives for a smaller power to acquire a nuclear capability and the possibility that it will be able to do so. Frequently it is concluded that once a country has eased over certain technical and economic hurdles, it will for reasons of power and prestige almost inevitably put forth the effort to gain admission to the nuclear club. For example, Denis Healey, now Britain’s Defense Minister, remarked in 1960, “So far, no country has resisted the temptation to make its own atomic weapons once it has acquired the physical ability to do so.”² In 1962, another British defense commentator, F. W. Mulley, observed “All the arguments which led Britain to decide to develop her own independent nuclear weapons are equally valid from the French point of view for France herself, and there is no reason why other members of NATO should not decide to follow suit.”³

In predicting “a rapid rise in the number of atomic powers . . . by the mid-1960’s,” a National Planning Association report argued in 1958 that the rate of diffusion would depend upon “each nation’s present technology, its present industrial capacity,

¹An earlier version of this paper was written at the University of California, Los Angeles, under the auspices of the Security Studies Center. The advice, assistance and encouragement of the Center's coordinator, R. N. Rosecrance, and of Peter Regenstreif and the Canadian Studies Program at the University of Rochester are gratefully acknowledged.


³The Race Against the H-Bomb (Fabian Tract 322, March 1960), p. 3.

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its level of education, and the rate at which these factors are changing." 4

The opposite consideration—the psychological and political as well as material incentives for a power to remain nonnuclear—has received less specific attention. The case of Canada is significant in this respect. For, as Leonard Beaton and John Maddox have pointed out in their important study of the Nth country problem, "Alone among the nations up to the present, she has had the undoubted capacity to produce atomic bombs and has chosen not to do so." 5

Nuclear weapons can be diffused in two ways: through independent manufacture or through international cooperation. Canada has remained a nonnuclear power despite temptations to avail herself of both media. Her experiences on the two possible nuclear paths will be analyzed here, and the particularities and generalities of the Canadian case will then be assessed.

DIFFUSION THROUGH INDEPENDENT MANUFACTURE: CANADA'S ATOMIC PROGRAM

Canada is in the best position of any of the nonnuclear powers to develop atomic weapons independently. She has extensive uranium resources within her borders, abundant sources of cheap hydroelectric power, an acknowledged ability to build highly respectable aircraft and air engines, a good quantity of scientists and technicians with the required skills, and open areas to serve as weapons test sites. Even France, in the estimation of Beaton and Maddox, has not been in as favorable a position to embark on a nuclear weapons program. 6

Britain and Canada—A Question of Image

During World War II Canada cooperated with Britain and the United States in atomic research and, at the war's end, found herself in possession of a small low-power atomic energy pile. The Canadian and British situations in world affairs were in many respects similar: neither then had NATO-type nuclear allies, neither was under a de facto nuclear umbrella, neither had any perceived enemy against which it was necessary to arm, both were

6 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
essentially invulnerable to any potential enemy, and both had the necessary resources, skills and manpower to launch a nuclear weapons program. Unlike Great Britain, however, Canada did not undertake such a program.¹

To an extent Canada considered herself already to be an atomic power. She was recognized as such for a brief period after the war by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. And, if the possession of reactors is used as the criterion, only the United States and Canada were atomic powers at this time. This fact, however, does not explain the difference between the Canadian and British cases. For, despite the lamentable absence of reactors on British soil, the United Kingdom set herself on the nuclear course, not stopping at the reactor stage, but instead going on to weapons development.

How can this policy difference be explained? Why did the British pursue a nuclear policy while the Canadians never considered the idea seriously? An important part of the answer can be found in the two countries' self-image. The British considered themselves to be a "great" power; Canada saw herself as a "middle" power. A modern great power has among its attributes the possession of atomic weapons, while a middle power operates by careful application of informal, moral and nonmilitary persuasion. A great power acts; a middle power influences.

The only powers now engaged in nuclear weapons programs—the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France and China—generally consider themselves to be great powers. Indeed they are

¹Beaton and Maddox assert that Canada rejected a nuclear weapons policy "in 1946 by a deliberate and conscious decision." (Op. cit., p. 98; also Leonard Beaton, "The Canadian White Paper on Defense," International Journal, Summer 1964, p. 364.) But to call Canada's arrival at a nonnuclear policy a "decision," let alone a "deliberate and conscious" one, appears to be overly imaginative. It seems rather that a nuclear policy was never thought of. An analysis of the histories and periodicals of the time, of the atomic energy debates, and of the biographies of Prime Minister Mackenzie King leads to the conclusion that there was no serious consideration of the pros and cons of developing an atomic weapons program. In all this literature the word "decision" is rarely used, and then only in a general way, referring to the policy arrived at, not the procedure for making it. This conclusion is supported by J. W. Pickersgill, an assistant to and biographer of Mackenzie King, a Liberal minister and M.P., and a powerful backstage figure in Ottawa from 1937 to 1953. He states: "... there were never any serious proponents of the view that Canada should develop its own atomic force. Certainly Mr. King had no such view." (Personal communication, November 26, 1962.) No general pronouncement that the military policy of Canada was nonnuclear was ever made. But that this was the policy was admitted in an offhand manner in the middle of a House of Commons debate in 1946, and this may be the date to which Beaton and Maddox refer. (Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 3, 1946, Vol. II, p. 2122.)
the countries designated by the framers of the United Nations Charter to occupy permanent seats on the Security Council. The only other nations that could conceivably be placed in this category are Germany and Japan (and possibly India). Although in the future a self-admitted lesser power may acquire nuclear weapons to confront a specific enemy challenge, to further its effectiveness as an armed neutral, or to attain international prestige, only the powers which see themselves to be “great” are now pursuing such a policy.

Canada is the only country in the world to slip in any sense from a “nuclear” to a “nonnuclear” status—if only by redefinition—and it may be instructive that she was able to do so without the embarrassment and anguish that such a transformation might cause a great power. Her experience may suggest that even if a middle power should attain a nuclear capability, it may be relatively easy to persuade it to revert to its more appropriate station.

The Canadian Atomic Program Since the War

Left with a reactor and with considerable experience in nuclear theory and technology after World War II, the Canadians continued a modest but sound nonmilitary atomic program, the pace of which has been somewhat leisurely. For example, the major Canadian reactor broke down in December 1952 and it was not back in operation until February 1954. A definite decline in enthusiasm and activity is evident in the annual reports of the Atomic Energy Control Board summarizing the past year’s progress. In reports of the late 1940’s a typical phrase was, “the performance of the NRX [reactor] ... has surpassed the expectations of its designers”; by the mid-1950’s the more common statement was, “assistance to Canadian universities ... was continued on a somewhat larger scale”; in the 1960-1961 report the section on progress was dropped altogether.

While development continues, particularly in the area of nuclear power, Canada is well aware of the expenses and frustrations entailed in a nuclear program, and perhaps has a better insight than could be expected of a less experienced nation into the difficulties involved in the independent manufacture of nuclear weapons.

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DIFFUSION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States has never offered to sell, loan or give to Canada any nuclear weapons that Canada could set off by herself. Under present American law such an offer would be impossible. Nevertheless, it would be a feasible policy alternative for Canada to ask for such an arrangement, and this approach has been seriously suggested. While he has since changed his mind, the American defense writer, Melvin Conant, proposed in 1960 that "Canada could ask for assistance from the United States in acquiring a modest but invulnerable, mobile, nuclear deterrent capability ... in return for a continuation of Canadian cooperation in making available to the United States its real estate and facilities for as long as these are useful." A similar proposal was made in 1958 by General Guy Granville Simonds, a former chief of the General Staff of the Canadian Army, and in 1959 by the prominent Canadian political economist and defense analyst, James Eayrs.

Independence and Weapons Diffusion

One of the important incentives (or at least arguments) for the attainment of a nuclear force has been the feeling that possession of nuclear weapons will guarantee independence for the smaller power from the "core" power. It has been argued by some that such a view is erroneous and that the British and French cases are demonstrating that, if anything, the opposite is true.

Whether an illusion or not, this incentive applies almost exclusively to the first type of diffusion—diffusion by independent manufacture. Diffusion through international cooperation clearly implies an increase of dependence. A situation in which one country gives or sells nuclear weapons to another without any strings attached is hardly likely. At the very least the donor power will seek to make sure that the weapons will not be used against itself. More than this, the donor will avoid involvement in such

See Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., Chapter 12.
a transaction unless it can assure itself that the weapons dispersal will further its own interest and that the weapons will be used only under certain conditions and on certain targets.

Opposition to the proposed NATO deterrent, which would primarily use U.S. nuclear weapons, has centered in fear of the loss of individual independence. France was wary of the Nassau Pact partly for this reason. Sweden and Switzerland are against acquiring nuclear weapons because this would cause dependence on the donor and thus compromise their traditional neutrality. India's acquisition of nuclear weapons would conflict radically with the deeply-felt Indian desire for autarchy.

Claims of increased dependence are voiced even when conventional weapons are spread by international cooperation. British and American expressions of alarm at the USSR-India MIG deal in 1962 were matched in intensity only by Khrushchev's outcries when India increased weapons purchases from the West during and after the Chinese border incursions.

This consideration especially relates to Canada, where there is already a substantial fear of becoming "the world's most northerly banana republic." For some Canadians anti-Americanism is a cultural pattern going back to the days of "manifest destiny" and "fifty-four forty or fight." It currently manifests itself, not in the rock-through-the-embassy-window violence found in some parts of the world, but rather in a carping, identity-seeking criticism of all things American, as well as in something of an inferiority complex. While on occasion certainly justifiable, much of the criticism, particularly of defense matters, appears to be factually unsound and overly suspicious.\(^8\)

**Where the Arrow Fell**

Canada's attitude toward atomic weapons and her disinclination to become a nuclear power through international cooperation were noisily brought out in the extended debate over the

purchase of atomic warheads. First, however, some comments should be made about the important Arrow affair.

The Arrow was a Canadian interceptor which, according to Beaton and Maddox, "would have reached full service by mid-1962 when it would probably have held the world's absolute speed record and would undoubtedly have been the most effective weapon in the air defense of North America." It was hoped that the plane would be a vital contribution to continental defense and that large numbers of the aircraft would be sold to the United States. By late 1958, however, the Conservative government was faced with delays and mounting costs in the program. Prime Minister Diefenbaker therefore decided, tentatively in September 1958 and finally in February 1959, to discontinue development of the aircraft and to replace it with the nuclear-tipped Bomarc anti-aircraft missile which was to be purchased from the United States. The decision came as a profound shock to the country, because the defense industry as well as much national self-respect had been keyed to the Arrow program.

From this experience Canada learned, as perhaps Britain is only now learning and France may yet have to learn, that she is woefully unable to keep up in the modern world of rapidly changing and exasperatingly uncertain weapons systems. As Eayrs pointed out at the time, the Canadian aircraft industry had been promoted by successive governments "as a cachet of economic maturity, a symbol of national greatness." But a great military aviation industry "has to do more than design and build a good war plane; it has to be able to take cancellations in its stride." For the Americans and the British, Eayrs felt, "scrapping an aircraft doesn't mean scrapping an industry. For us it does."

The Arrow affair strengthened Canada's feeling of having become militarily obsolete and her yearning for neutralism and isolationism. Many found it easy to agree with an American defense writer's estimate in a prominent Canadian journal: the Arrow "was the only remaining Canadian contribution of significance to continental defense." With its cancellation and the ensuing Bomarc dispute, Canadians "witness the collapse of their


"As Canadian Aviation noted, "There is hardly a plant which was not giving some portion of its production facility for participation in the Arrow program." (Editorial, October 1958, p. 23.) The economic and strategic arguments against the Arrow are given by James Eayrs, "Defending the Realm: (1) 'I Shot an Arrow in the Air . . .'," Canadian Forum, September 1958, pp. 121 ff.


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own contribution to North American defense."

"Canada's National Magazine," Maclean's, editorialized on March 28, 1959, a month after the announcement of the Arrow decision:

We are a non-Power . . . . [We should] make an open announcement that Canada has discovered itself to be obsolete as a military nation, and intends therefore to strive for peace mainly as an economic and political nation. Honor our existing military commitments until they run out, but make it clear that our ultimate establishment will consist only of modest, modestly armed mobile units available for United Nations police duty.

The Debate over Warheads

The Arrow-Bomarc decision was one in a series committing Canada to a nuclear-supporting policy. In December 1957, the new Conservative government agreed in NATO to the policy of arming NATO forces with U.S.-controlled tactical nuclear weapons. Between 1957 and 1962 Canada armed herself with five carriers for nuclear weapons at a cost of $685 million. But at the same time a tide of public opinion (or at least journalistic opinion, for in late 1962 barely half of the public knew what a Bomarc was) began to rise against the actual purchase of nuclear weapons and warheads for these carriers. Caught between the pressures of anti-nuclear opinion at home and nuclear commitment in its alliances, the government responded by indecision: it refused to acquire the warheads and it also refused to refuse them, rendering the carriers in part useless. As a consequence the crew at one Bomarc base went off twenty-four-hour alert and onto an eight-hour day because, even in the event of war, they could make no contribution to defense.

Diefenbaker adopted a number of stratagems to explain his procrastination. At various times he apparently refused to make the nuclear leap because U.S. procedures of joint control were inadequate, because such a move might cripple progress on disarmament, because competent carriers had not yet been introduced into Canada's NATO forces, and because there was no


John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion (Clarkson, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963), p. 98.
The confusion was enriched by a division of feeling in the Cabinet. The Minister of National Defense favored acquisition of nuclear warheads; the Minister of External Affairs opposed such a policy.

This division pervaded the entire political arena. Perhaps, as one Canadian has said, "It is un-Canadian to be unequivocal." The opposition Liberals, who designed all of Canada's defense commitments until 1957, seemed at times to reject nuclear weapons point-blank and at other times to be agreeable to accepting them. The five-year dialogue between the two major parties has been accurately characterized by Beaton and Maddox as "a competition to avoid being the first to favor the adoption by Canada of nuclear weapons while also avoiding charges of feebleness towards the alliance." The views of the socialists in the New Democratic Party seemed to be more definitely anti-nuclear. In 1960 the party urged a withdrawal from NORAD with some members favoring withdrawal from NATO, although later NDP policy appeared to be milder.

The position of the press was likewise ambiguous. The party-oriented newspapers reflected the confusions of their parties. Maclean's, which urged a neutralist policy after 1959, continued to employ a defense writer who favored acquisition of nuclear warheads. Beyond the parties and journals there were groups actively opposing Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons and in some cases urging a neutralist foreign policy.

Public opinion on the issue was split, but it was far more favorable toward nuclear arms than the neutralist agitation would make it appear. According to a Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIP0) poll conducted late in 1962, 54 per cent were in favor of nuclear arms, 32 per cent were opposed, and 14 per cent were undecided.


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cent gave qualified answers or had no opinion to render. Opinion among Canadian politicians was found in another survey to be vastly more antagonistic toward nuclear arms.

Finally, in January 1963, the problem came into sharper focus. Early in the month retiring NATO chief General Lauris Norstad, at a press conference in Ottawa, apparently unaware of the touchiness of the issue, admitted under intense questioning that Canada had committed its forces in Europe under NATO command to accept nuclear warheads. Taken aback at the acute interest in the subject, Norstad stated at one point, "I am not sure what I am getting into here." What he had done was to give "the first authoritative definition of the role to be played in NATO by Canadian forces." His statement set off a series of political repercussions. By January 12, Opposition leader Lester Pearson had decided to take the initiative and in a speech demanded that the government end its "evasion of responsibility" and accept the nuclear arms. Diefenbaker responded by offering yet another excuse for procrastination: the Nassau Agreement of December 1962 presaged a change in NATO policy, he said, and thus it would be unwise for Canada to decide finally until after the May 1963 NATO meeting. In the debate Diefenbaker disclosed that Canada and the United States had been engaged in secret negotiations on the subject, and some of the information he offered was felt by the U.S. State Department to be erroneous. Accordingly the Department on January 30 issued a note of 474 words which managed, in sonorous diplomatic tone, to call Diefenbaker an incompetent, a welsher on commitments, a breaker of promises, and a liar.

Representatives of all parties joined Diefenbaker in voicing indignation at what was seen to be unwarranted interference in Canadian affairs. But the question had been clearly put and the government, already facing a series of votes of confidence on economic measures, crumbled.

CIPO #299, data supplied by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center of Williamstown, Massachusetts. The question asked was, "Just from what you know or have heard, in your opinion, should Canada's armed forces be armed with nuclear weapons or not?" There was little difference between the supporters and opponents of nuclear arms on demographic grounds. Liberal and Conservative voters had similar views on the issue, while NDP supporters generally opposed and sympathizers of the right wing Social Credit Party strongly favored nuclear arms. Supporters were about 10 per cent more likely than opponents to disapprove of wheat sales to China and to be skeptical both about reaching a peaceful settlement with the USSR and about the prospects that a disarmament agreement would work. There was no difference between the two groups, however, on their fears about the dangers of a nuclear war breaking out.

Paul and Laulicht, op. cit., p. 84.

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There followed one of the bitterest election campaigns in Canadian history. The Liberals promised to honor Canada's nuclear "commitments," but pledged that they would attempt to renegotiate the country into a nonnuclear position as soon as possible. The Conservatives, badly split under Diefenbaker's leadership, promised to continue things the way they were. The New Democratic Party adopted a clearly anti-nuclear position tinged with neutralism.

Other issues were raised, but the nuclear issue dominated the campaign until by March 14 the Vancouver Sun was complaining:

By now every nuclear hair has been split, every nook and cranny explored, every possibility exhausted.... Most voters must by now be thoroughly tired of the nuclear theme song and long to hear an intelligent speech about remedies for the country's other problems.27

In the election of April 8, 1963 the Conservatives were defeated and the Liberals attained a near majority. Despite the noise over the warheads, however, it appears that the issue was not directly responsible for altering many votes.28 Pearson was easily able to get Parliament to accept the warheads for Canada's forces and, contrary to Beaton and Maddox's prediction, there are no signs that the implementation of this nuclear policy will lead to a desire for a national nuclear force.29 Indeed, the issue has dropped from sight.

THE CANADIAN CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR STATUS

Despite an obvious ability to produce nuclear weapons, Canada

27A curious indication of the extent of feeling is afforded by the reaction of some Canadian veterinarians who had been planning to break off from the American Veterinary Medical Association. Fearing that their action would be interpreted as a consequence of the crisis over nuclear warheads, they decided to put it off until things cooled down. (Winnipeg Free Press, February 11, 1963, p. 3.)

28See Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada (Toronto: Longmans, 1965), pp. 73-74. A CIPO poll administered shortly before the election (#301, March 1963), found opinion on the nuclear issue to be about the same as it had been in the fall. The overall figures, however, masked a number of major shifts of opinion within the population that tended to cancel each other out. Support for nuclear arms dropped precipitously among Conservative and Social Credit partisans, and soared among the Liberals. In the earlier survey lower status Canadians tended to be slightly more supportive of nuclear arms than those of higher status. By election time this configuration was sharply reversed, with support strongly correlated with status and education. As part of this, there was a striking drop in support by French Canadians. (From data supplied by the Roper Center.) See also Wallace Gagne and Peter Regenstreif, "Canadian Public Opinion and Nuclear Defence," New York State Political Science Association Paper, March 1967.

29Op. cit., p. 107. In a CIPO survey conducted in the summer of 1966 (#319), Canadians were found to be more opposed to arming their forces with nuclear weapons than they had been at the time of the election.

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has refused to develop weapons independently and has shown a
great reluctance to acquire even tactical joint-controlled weapons
through international cooperation. The "disincentives" for de­
veloping a nuclear capability, rendered explicit in the debate
over nuclear weapons, will be considered here under four head­
ings: economic, military, political and psychological.

Economic Disincentives

Canadians are better informed than the people of any other
nonnuclear nation about the costs of a nuclear weapons program.
They have developed a peaceful atomic energy program and have
found far less satisfaction in it than they originally hoped; they
have become aware of the disappointments and unexpected costs
that invariably ensue. Furthermore, the Arrow affair demon­
strated dramatically the exasperations involved in competing in
modern delivery systems. Finally, Canada is closely associated
with the United Kingdom in temperament and tradition and thus
has been attuned to the disappointments and soul-searchings in­
volved in the British quest for an independent deterrent.

As Beaton and Maddox note, they is sometimes argued that
nuclear weapons will provide a cheaper defense and will be useful
to an advanced economy. This argument has not been heard in
Canada, for the Canadians have experienced the economic realities
of a nuclear weapons program.

Military Disincentives

The usual military or strategic cautions apply also to Canada:
nuclear arms would make the country a prime target; they would
be a danger because of possible accidents; and they might be
provocative to the USSR. Though they apply less well, these
arguments have even been used against the acquisition of nuclear
warheads for defensive NORAD weapons. As one writer put it,
"if nuclear war does start, all the nuclear nations will be obliged
to devour one another. The atomic club is a suicide club." The
Soviets are aware of this attitude. Some of their rocket-rattling
has been directed at Canada, and it has had its effect.

Second, as her delayed reaction in the Cuban crisis of October
1962 indicates, Canada feels herself to be in no direct or immedi­
ate danger. She is not part of a China-India or Arab-Israeli type

"John B. Witchell, "One Man Can Do Something to Ward Off Nuclear War,"
Maclean's, October 8, 1960, p. 10.
of confrontation in which fears mount that the enemy will attain nuclear arms. While she is involved in an alliance aimed at a perceived Soviet threat, the threat is general and is posed for the entire alliance, not just for Canada. In this, however, Canada is no different from Britain and France.

Third, Canada has no reason to feel that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Canada has declined. The British and especially the French have used such a perceived decline as an excuse in their struggles for independent nuclear forces. "Canadian soil," a former Canadian Foreign Ministry official has said, "is so important to the defense of the United States that we have not been inclined to worry about its losing interest in our fate." This disincentive, which is a direct result of geography, is unique to the Canadian case.

Fourth, Canada is engaged in no colonial or foreign adventures by herself. Thus, unlike France and Britain, she has never been able to imagine a use for an independent nuclear force in areas where the United States was not directly involved.

Finally, Canada's military tradition is a restraining influence. As part of the middle power self-image, she has no memories of military grandeur and no zeal for expansion. Indeed, one book on Canadian military history is subtitled "The Military History of an Unmilitary People." As a result of this the military in Canada, which presumably would be most amenable to a nuclear weapons program, seems weaker as a political influence than its counterpart in many other countries. Canada's military forces have played essentially a late-arriving, secondary role in the major wars and the RCAF, as Beaton and Maddox note, has never been engaged separately in strategic bombing.

Political Disincentives

Canada sees her restrained, nonnuclear posture as a source of prestige and influence in world councils. The opposite may be true for Britain and France, which still harbor visions of great power and grandeur. But Canadians seem to feel "that the advantages of an atomic arsenal would be offset by the hostility its possession could be expected to arouse in a world public opinion still disposed to place nuclear weapons and their owners in a..."
special category of iniquity." Canada values her influence, real or imagined, over the emerging nations, particularly those in the Commonwealth. Taking France as a norm, it is often casually assumed that all countries, when they are able, will seek a nuclear capability as an international status or virility symbol. But the prestige Canada finds in nonnuclear status may prove to be a more typical emotion.

The reason probably most often given by those opposed to Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads is that such an action will encourage the spread of nuclear weapons and adversely affect progress on disarmament. As Maclean's editorialized on January 27, 1962, "refusal is the only way to limit membership in the 'nuclear club' effectively, and the only effective protest against the acceptance of nuclear war as a tolerable consequence of national policy." While this argument is strongly advocated in Canada and in many other countries, its effectiveness as a motive for nuclear restraint would not remain high should nuclear capabilities begin to be more widely diffused. On the other hand, any prestige incentives for becoming nuclear would also presumably decline in a world in which nuclear capacities were relatively common and indistinctive.

The idea that Canada has a special and significant mission to perform in limiting nuclear diffusion and in promoting disarmament is an accepted component of the political lore of the nation. Diefenbaker several times expressed a fear of encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons and of hampering disarmament progress as reasons for procrastination on a final warheads decision. It is often proposed that the country initiate a "self-denying ordinance" in the United Nations to help limit nuclear diffusion. A nation with this attitude does not make a likely prospect for the nuclear club.

Psychological Disincentives

As has been noted, there is a loss of independence involved when nuclear weapons are diffused through international co-

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*The public and especially the elites in Canada seem to be firmly convinced that nuclear diffusion will greatly increase the danger of an atomic war. (Paul and Laulicht, *op. cit.,* p. 86.)*


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operation. Canadians, with their distinct brand of anti-Americanism, have been wary of obtaining even minor nuclear weapons from their dominating southern neighbor. Highly vocal protest is certain if ever acquisition of independent strategic weapons is considered.

Canada's middle power complex is another potent psychological barrier to acquisition of nuclear weapons. Her self-image as an influential, but not militarily powerful, actor on the world scene has great appeal and is widely accepted. An independent nuclear capability (and for many Canadians, a dependent one) does not fit into this image at all.

Insofar as inertia is a psychological force, it also serves to keep Canada nonnuclear. After twenty-two years of "nuclear restraint," Canadians have become used to the idea. The policy has worked for this long, why change now? Inertia seems to have influenced the British the other way in 1945; their work on bomb development was, as R. N. Rosecrance notes, essentially the completion of a project interrupted by the war.40

Finally, "morality" has proved to be important in the discussion over nuclear warheads. Some Canadians, after careful objective analysis, find their country to be morally superior to their gigantic neighbor.41 They attach a moral value to being a nonnuclear power. Nuclear weapons are seen as contaminating and abhorrent, and the possessor is seen to be committed to a policy of mass devastation. Canada, the editors of Maclean's believe, must protest against this immoral weapon by refusing nuclear warheads: "It is the only thing a small nation can do to express its horror of nuclear war, and to make the great powers pause."42 This revulsion can even lead to a desire for a sort of unarmed neutrality, a stance preferred as late as 1964 by 11 per cent of the population (20 per cent in Quebec).43 A Canadian journalist

41This view is caricatured by a Canadian political scientist: "Having studied thousands of Canadian editorials, and listened to as many speeches and conversations, I have come to the conclusion that the fault with North America is an improper division of resources: the Americans got the power; the Canadians the virtue and common sense." He goes on to suggest as a solution that the U.S. become Canada's eleventh province. (Letter to the editor, Maclean's, November 5, 1960, p. 4.)
42November 19, 1960, p. 4.
43CIPO press release, April 14, 1964. In comparison, nonalignment (not necessarily unarmed, however) was preferred in early 1963 by 54 per cent of the French, 38 per cent of the Italians, 38 per cent of the British, 25 per cent
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has dubbed Canada’s defense position one of “nuclear virgin­itv.” But in this case virginity is more than a state of being; it is almost a psychological complex.

This sense of moral revulsion will probably serve to increase the effectiveness for Canadians and like-minded peoples of the test ban treaty and other legalistic measures designed to discourage nuclear diffusion. In order to begin a testing program now Canada would have to abrogate an international treaty, making such a policy seem even more “dirty” and “immoral” than before. The treaty thus has increased—probably significantly for a number of powers—the costs of independent nuclear weapons development.

THE CANADIAN CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Canadians like to boast that their country has great influence in the affairs of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance, the emerging nations, the UN, and the world. To an extent this is true. The Canadian foreign service is one of the finest in the world and Canada’s record in international affairs, particularly after the war under the leadership of Lester Pearson, has impressed many international leaders as well as the Nobel Peace Prize committee. Much of the boast, however, is unrealistic. As Edgar McInnis has soberly observed, “The frequently repeated claim that Canada serves as a bridge or an interpreter, while it may be justified on some special occasions, is more often a myth that is cherished for the sake of self-esteem.”

In influencing the rate of nuclear dispersion, Canada’s impact, despite the protestations of the anti-warhead people, seems to have been even more modest. Eayrs flatly insists that her example of the Japanese, 22 per cent of the Australians, and 16 per cent of the West Germans. (United States Information Agency Report, Some Indications of World­wide Public Opinion Toward the U.S. and the USSR, R-141-63 (R), July 1963.)

At least one person, in an argument that was later used in the 1963 campaign, found Canada’s moral position on nuclear weapons somewhat shaky. The nation, he noted, had been supplying fissionable material for weapons purposes since 1944: “Why should she have qualms now? Her position may be compared to that of the dope peddler who is on the verge of becoming an addict. It is of some significance that the dope peddler is generally deplored more than the addict.” (J. W. Hilborn, quoted in Conant, The Long Polar Watch, p. 97.)


“Quoted in Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, p. 3.

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"will do little or nothing to prevent the spread of atomic weapons throughout the states-system," and Beaton and Maddox note that "even the advocates of a non-nuclear club in Britain and elsewhere have seldom noticed that the club already has a member."46

But while Canada may not be much of an influence, there are many disincentives in the Canadian case which are likely to have relevance elsewhere; she may in many respects prove to be typical.

The National Planning Association's pamphlet, The Nth Country and Arms Control, published in 1960, contains ratings of countries as potential nuclear powers. Twelve countries listed in Group I are declared to be "able to embark on a successful nuclear weapons program in the near future"; the eight listed in Group II are "economically capable, fairly competent technically, although perhaps somewhat more limited in scientific manpower than the countries in Group I"; and six more, in Group III, are "probably economically capable, although more limited in industrial resources and scientific manpower," thus unlikely to achieve "a successful nuclear weapons program within five years." While these standards tend generally to make the achievement of a successful program seem much easier than it has proved to be, they permit a convenient ranking of most of those countries which are in any meaningful sense potential nuclear powers.47

Of the twenty-six nations two, France and China, are engaged in nuclear weapons programs. Four more are Warsaw Pact countries and presumably will remain under Soviet control, at least in the area of nuclear weapons development.

Most of the Canadian disincentives apply to most of the remaining countries ranked. Canada, listed in Group I, is peculiar in only two respects. First, she is uniquely well informed on the economic problems involved in an atomic weapons program. But this disincentive is most easily communicated and most easily duplicated: economic experiences are more readily transmitted than moral attitudes and military traditions. Thus although reactor technology, as it becomes more widespread, serves to prepare a nation to attempt a nuclear weapons program, it also

46 Earyn, "Canada, NATO . . .," p. 6; Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., p. 108.
47 "(Washington), pp, 27-28. The technical report is by William C. Davidon, Marvin Kalkstein and Christoph Hohenemser. Israel probably would fit into one of the three groups but is neglected by the list makers. For a discussion of her capabilities, see Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., Chapter 11.
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inevitably infuses a more realistic attitude toward the costs and tribulations involved in producing even a minimal capacity. Furthermore, the economic agonies experienced by the British and soon possibly by the French are likely to be more widely and more generally understood.

Second, Canada because of her geography is not likely to feel that U.S. credibility has declined. The French complain about this decline, but since their misgivings are not shared by some of the other alliance members that are not planning atomic weapons programs, one is inclined to dismiss such expressions as rationalizations, not reasons. Leonard Beaton argues that the main objectives for France (and China) in attaining a nuclear capability were prestige and status, not military security. Richard Rosecrance is inclined to agree: "If France were truly fearful of a Soviet strike, it seems likely that she would seek a closer nuclear integration with the United States." Nevertheless, other alliance partners, should they decide on a nuclear program, could use the excuse about U.S. disinterest with as much validity as France; Canada could not. This whole consideration, of course, applies almost exclusively to those potential nuclear nations which belong to the U.S. alliance system. The problem of U.S. credibility does not relate, at least not directly, to the advanced neutral nations.

With these qualifications made, it seems clear that the Canadian case applies to several of the lesser powers in NATO. They are also militarily unpretentious powers with middle power complexes, moral objections to nuclear weapons, a nonnuclear inertia, genuine fears about encouraging nuclear diffusion, and better ideas of what to do with their money. For example, Norway (Group III) and Denmark (Group II) have refused to allow even NATO-controlled nuclear weapons on their territory, a policy advocated by strong elements within their political structures and broadly supported by public opinion. This position is based in part, especially in Norway, on the theory that the Soviet Union might be led to interfere with Finland's neutrality should threatening nuclear weapons appear elsewhere in Scan-


"A Norwegian poll found in 1962 that only 8 per cent thought it advantageous to have atomic weapons in Norway. (John Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position," Peace Research Society [International] Papers, 1965, p. 229.)
The position of the Netherlands (II) and Belgium (I), while not so vocally anti-nuclear, is similar. Italy (I), with a military tradition which is certainly not comparable to Canada's, will probably remain content as a middle power and continue to take on the psychological, political, military and economic attitudes appropriate to that status.

The European neutrals pose a different problem. Sweden (I) and Switzerland (I) have a military tradition of armed neutrality which, some feel, would be enhanced by the incorporation into their forces of nuclear weapons. But the moral objection is strong in these countries, particularly in the Social Democratic parties. Furthermore, like Canada, they find their nonnuclear status to be a source of international prestige and influence. As one Swedish defense writer has noted, "To the degree that a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons would seriously impair Sweden's 'peace mongering capacity,' this consideration is liable to inhibit a decision in favor of nuclear weapons production." He further points out that Sweden is particularly wary of encouraging diffusion by example: "... the political authorities have regarded all steps inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons as vital to Sweden's own security." Finally, as noted above, the strong desire in Sweden and Switzerland for independence will be an indirect disincentive since it will tend to dissuade them from accepting nuclear weapons through the more economical method of international cooperation.

Most of this can also be said for the unarmed neutrals, Austria (II) and Finland (II), which have, additionally, a particularly severe problem of military vulnerability.

Not unexpectedly, the Canadian case has considerable relevance to Australia (II) and likewise to New Zealand, which is not listed. All the Canadian disincentives apply, except that should China develop a threatening nuclear capability these countries (particularly Australia) might feel a critical enough danger to begin their own weapons development. But there are

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"See also Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., Chapters 9 and 10."
many Australians who would violently oppose such a move with arguments that are familiar from the Canadian experience. Of course, a greater and more credible U.S. effort in that area in the event of a Chinese nuclear threat might well suffice, for Australia will decide to develop a nuclear capability only if Britain and the United States fail to give her a firm nuclear guarantee. Even since the Chinese atomic tests, the Australian government has declared firmly that it has no present intention of becoming a nuclear power, and one commentator has argued that

China’s success with nuclear tests may, on balance, act as a deterrent to any Australian temptations to acquire nuclear capacity or station U.S. nuclear forces on Australian territory. A nuclear arsenal in Australia, as a response to China, could trigger exactly the kind of reactions in Asia that Australia wishes to avoid. One could well be Asian exaggeration of present Chinese nuclear strength and a corresponding state of panic. The other would be the urge of Asian states to climb on the nuclear bandwagon by one means or another.

The Chinese situation has an even more direct effect on India (I) and Japan (I). Should the Chinese nuclear threat become imminent, India with greatest reluctance may be compelled to develop her own capability. In the Indian case, however, one can find probably the most extreme example of some of the Canadian disincentives: the moral objection, the fear of increased dependence, the aversion to encouraging nuclear diffusion, the non-nuclear habit, the feeling of self-respecting prestige that comes with nonnuclear status, and the middle power “influencing” complex. In addition, the country is restrained by a chronic need to expend economic resources on other requirements and by a concern that Pakistan would be inclined to imitate any nuclear advances.

Japan is India’s chief rival in the moral abhorrence of nuclear weapons; it has been estimated that even after the Chinese tests, “no more than 10 per cent of Japanese favor nuclear weapons.

See Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., Chapter 8; Michael C. Michaud, India as a Nuclear Power (Los Angeles: University of California, Security Studies Center, 1963); articles in Survival, March-April 1965; and Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread?, pp. 71-77.
for either their own or American-base forces." While an immediate nuclear threat may be enough to overcome these disincentives, it is also possible that the disincentives could channel the reaction to the threat into nonnuclear patterns: alliance, use of the United Nations, or even capitulation. And if the Chinese develop a capability but do not use it directly as a threat, the disincentives in these countries may encourage accommodation rather than the independent development of nuclear weapons.

West Germany, the only other member of Group I, is unencumbered by many of the Canadian disincentives, yet it could initiate a nuclear weapons program only with the most severe international repercussions. There remain only Yugoslavia in Group II and Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain and the Union of South Africa in Group III, none of which seems to be ardently inclined toward membership in the nuclear club at present. Even if one adds to the consideration Egypt, Israel and Indonesia, it is difficult to see exactly which are to be the "several" other states that C. P. Snow predicted would have "stocks of nuclear bombs" by 1966.

These, then, are some of the inferences that can be drawn from the Canadian case. Although certain other countries may have more or better reasons than Canada to become nuclear powers, it can be seen that many of the Canadian incentives for restraint are broadly applicable. As a direct influence her impact on the progress of nuclear diffusion may be minimal. But Canada's experience as the first self-restrained nonnuclear power seems to have wide relevance and suggests at the extreme that the Nth country problem may have already approached a finite solution.

"Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Japan Reviews Her American Alliance," Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1966, p. 10. Mendel also notes that in a survey conducted in 1963, only 5 per cent of the Japanese respondents advocated reacting to a Chinese nuclear capability by strengthening the alliance with the United States or by accepting nuclear weapons from America (p. 16n). (See also Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread?, pp. 69-71.)

"See Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., Chapter 6. A poll conducted in 1963 by the United States Information Agency discovered that only about a tenth of the Germans interviewed were in favor of West Germany having its own nuclear force. (USIA Report, Public Opinion About NATO and Nuclear Issues in Western Europe, R-100-63 (R), July 1963.) A poll in 1964 found German elites to be equally opposed to a national nuclear deterrent. (Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary Report," American Political Science Review, June 1966, p. 363.)

"China reportedly was planning at one time to fly a nuclear device to Indonesia, where Chinese scientists would set it off. Sukarno was to take the credit, gaining presumably in power status and prestige, and the event was expected to cause throughout Asia psychological and political turmoil that would redound to China's advantage. This imaginative, if bizarre, scheme was quashed in the Indonesian coup of 1965. (See C. L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: The Nutcracker Suite," New York Times, April 10, 1966, p. 8E.)"
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